In: Organon F, vol. 29, no. 1
Víctor Fernández Castro
Year, pages: 2022, 109 - 127
Descriptivism; factualism; fundamental categories; mental vocabulary.
Article type: Research Article
Inspired by the work of Sellars, Cumpa (2014, 2018) and Buonomo (2021) have argued that we can evaluate our metaphysical proposals on fundamental categories in terms of their capacity for reconciling the scientific and the manifest image of the world. This criterion of fundamentality would allow us to settle the question of which categories among those proposed in the debate—e.g., substance, structure or facts—have a better explanatory value. The aim of this essay is to argue against a central assumption of the criterion: semantic descriptivism. Specifically, I aim at showing that the criterion rests on the idea that the manifest picture is mostly a description of the world, and thus, it commits us with certain realism. Instead, I argue that at least some of the vocabulary we use to construct our manifest picture of the world, mental vocabulary, is evaluative rather than descriptive and thus creates problems in reconcile the manifest picture with scientific psychology and neurosciences. I conclude with some remarks on alternatives that could provide a way out of the fundamentality criterion.
How to cite:
Fernández Castro, V. 2022. Factualism and Anti-Descriptivism: A Challenge to the Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality. In Organon F, vol. 29, no.1, pp. 109-127. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29105
Fernández Castro, V. (2022). Factualism and Anti-Descriptivism: A Challenge to the Materialist Criterion of Fundamentality. Organon F, 29(1), 109-127. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29105
Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR
Published: 28. 2. 2022
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0)