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Kooperatívny naturalizmus

In: Filozofia, vol. 76, no. 9
Martin Nuhlíček

Details:

Year, pages: 2021, 647 - 660
Language: slo
Keywords:
A. I. Goldman – Naturalized Epistemology – Normativity – Reliabilism – W. V. O. Quine
Article type: State / Original articles
Document type: Časopis / Journal
About article:
The paper deals with the cooperative model of epistemological naturalism, which, while promoting strong influence of empirical information on epistemological considerations, rejects Quinean radical reduction of epistemic relations to non-epistemic ones, e.g., causal-nomological relations. The character of this kind of naturalism is illustrated by the example of A. Goldman’s epistemics. This conception consists of two intertwined elements: a priori performed conceptual analysis of epistemic concepts, supplemented by empirical studies of human cognition. First, the dynamics between the a priori and the empirical re- spective parts of this conception is explained, and, second, three important epistemological issues are discussed from its point of view: the problem of starting points of inquiry, the problem of intuitions, and the problem of normativity.
How to cite:
ISO 690:
Nuhlíček, M. 2021. Kooperatívny naturalizmus. In Filozofia, vol. 76, no.9, pp. 647-660. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.9.1

APA:
Nuhlíček, M. (2021). Kooperatívny naturalizmus. Filozofia, 76(9), 647-660. 0046-385X. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.9.1
About edition:
Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV / InSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SLOVAK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Published: 16. 11. 2021
Rights:
Creative Commons License
Toto dielo je licencované pod Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License