Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues

Year, pages: 2020, 539 - 555

I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.

Mărăşoiu, A. 2020. Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues. In Organon F, vol. 27, no.4, pp. 539-555. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408

Mărăşoiu, A. (2020). Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues. Organon F, 27(4), 539-555. 1335-0668. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408

Publisher: Filozofický ústav SAV, Filosofický ústav AVČR

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0)