

# Nationalisation of the Czech Local Party System: Case Study of the 2010 Local Elections in Municipalities with Extended Powers<sup>1</sup>

Pavel Maškarinec<sup>2</sup>

Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, Ústí nad Labem

## **Nationalisation of the Czech Local Party System: Case Study of the 2010 Local Elections in Municipalities with Extended Powers.**

The question of party system nationalisation has recently come to the fore of research activities, as it emphasizes the importance of spatial aspects of the overall institutionalization of the party systems. However, within this topic, one area remains almost completely ignored. Specifically, an analysis of the interdependence of local party systems with the country's national party system. In this article, we seek to address this existing gap in scholarly inquiry by examining local party system nationalisation using data from the 2010 local elections in the Czech Republic. We analyse the degree of local party system nationalisation (employing Kjær and Elklit's index of local party system nationalisation) and test hypotheses about the effects of population size and other independent variables on varying degree of local party system nationalisation in 205 municipalities with extended powers and the capital city of Prague. We conclude that the best way to express the degree of local party system nationalisation is in effective terms. At the same time, we found two variables, which proved to have the greatest significant independent impact on the degree of local party system nationalisation – population size and competitiveness.

Sociológia 2015, Vol. 47 (No. 6: 625-656)

**Key words:** *Czech Republic; local elections; political parties; parliamentary parties; non-parliamentary parties; local parties; local party system nationalisation*

## **Introduction**

Population size has been considered as one of the key variables affecting the form of local politics, at least since 1973 when Robert Alan Dahl and Edward Rolf Tufte published their seminal work, *Size and Democracy*, analysing the relationship between the size of political units and characteristics of their administration. Dahl and Tufte's conclusions were subsequently verified by Carsten Anckar (2000), who confirmed the following general rule: the larger the municipality the higher the political fragmentation. A significant role of size was also confirmed by Kenneth Newton (1982), who, however, showed that larger municipalities are not necessarily less powerful or less democratic. Dahl and Tufte analysed the relationship between the size of the units and party systems and noted that diversity is one of the most important factors through which size of political units affects the degree of fragmentation of the party

---

<sup>1</sup> The present article is one of results of the project „Voter behaviour in a multilevel settings”, which was financially supported from funds for institutional research of the Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, for 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Address: Mgr. Pavel Maškarinec, Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University, Pasteurova 3571/13, 400 96 Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic. E-mail: maskarinec@centrum.cz

system. While smaller units are homogeneous (with respect to the opinions, attitudes and goals of their population), increasing the size of units increases their diversity (Dahl – Tufte 1973: 13-14) and there are permanent and obvious differences in political views, interests and requirements. (Dahl – Tufte 1973: 91) This is perceptible both in an increased organizational diversity and complexness of a wide range of organizations and institutions producing a higher degree of specialization and complexity as well as in an assumed growth in attitude diversity. (Dahl – Tufte 1973: 30-40) Diversity of party competition (e.g. the number of candidates' entities or proportion of the votes for the biggest party) is also associated with increasing urbanization, scope of specialization, differentiation of labour, social differentiation and other factors. (Dahl – Tufte 1973: 100-102) Political diversity thus acts as an intervening variable influencing, along with the size of the monitored units, form of political competition. A significant role of the size was also confirmed by Newton (1982), who showed that in larger cities we can expect not only the existence of political parties but also a developed and competitive party system. (Newton 1982: 201)

Considerable unity on the conclusion that the degree of politicization of local political systems affects the municipality size exists also in the Czech Republic (or Czechia). This finding previously verified the amount of work that analyzed the relation between the municipality size and, for example: a) voter turnout (Šaradín 2004b; Kostecký 2005; Kostecký – Krivý 2015); b) the format of local party systems (Hoskovec – Balík 2010); c) the success of an association of independent candidates and theirs coalitions (Jüptner 2008); d) the emergence of and form of municipal coalitions (Jüptner 2004); or, e) the overall shape of local political systems. (Hudák et al. 2003)

Nevertheless, according to other authors, the nature of this relationship should be subject to a further examination. The question primarily arises whether the reality is closer to the model of linear association (the bigger the community, the higher the degree of politicization) or model of two different types of policies, between which there is not a smooth transition. (Ryšavý 2006: 967)<sup>3</sup> While Czech local elections in smaller (and partly in medium-sized) municipalities are dominated by the phenomenon of independent candidates, with increasing municipal size, the role of political parties proportionally increases, and it manifests itself most clearly in the case of statutory towns where political parties dominate the electoral contest. (cf. Krutílek 2003: 56-62; Balík 2009: 141-159) On the other hand, even at this

---

<sup>3</sup> The studies analyzing the level of electoral participation on one hand identified the existence of considerable differences in the participation according to the size category of municipalities, yet on the other hand they did not unequivocally confirm a linear association. (Šaradín 2004b; Kostecký 2005; Balík 2008a; Balík 2008b)

level the success of various non-parliamentary parties is not uncommon. (cf. Šaradín 2004a: 112-117)<sup>4</sup>

Such findings thus necessitate a more in-depth insight which would demonstrate why individual local party systems differ from one another and with a higher level of accuracy would concurrently respond to the question regarding the extent of intermingling of local party systems as (sub)systems of the national party system. While some authors allege that electoral behaviour of the electorate in large cities is in local and parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic almost identical (Čmejrek 2008: 62), others (Balík 2008a) argue that electoral behaviour in Czech municipalities with extended powers is on one hand uniform in the groups of individual types of elections, yet on the other hand and despite a certain association between electoral behaviour in parliamentary and local elections it appears that electoral patterns in the municipalities with extended powers in local elections possess their own logic and dynamics which do not quite comply with the logic and dynamics in parliamentary elections. In the cities as well the voters differentiate between local and parliamentary levels and accordingly behave in the elections. (cf. Balík 2008a: 313-333) Such findings thus exhibit a certain level of peculiarity of local politics in larger cities and refute assumptions about close interconnectedness between its local voter preferences and parliamentary preferences, i.e. a direct derivation of the form of local politics from a political clash occurring at a national level. (Balík 2008a: 333)<sup>5</sup>

However, does the size of a scrutinized political unit (municipality) itself also affect the form of its local party system in the sense of congruency of its form with higher levels of a political (party) system, i.e. may we identify a spatial convergence of party support in local and national elections along with the growth in the number of inhabitants residing in individual municipalities? If yes, to what extent? May we speak of a linear relation between the nationalisation of local politics and the size of municipality, or there is no fluid transition between them? And even if such an effect exists, does it not rather constitute only a conditioned (contingent) influence dependent on many other

---

<sup>4</sup> In contrast, in regional elections in the Czech Republic, the phenomenon of independent candidates does not play any role as an electoral law prohibits (unlike in local elections) the candidacy of independents, but only candidacy of political parties and movements or their coalitions. On the other hand, in regional elections we may also observe a significant growth (particularly in the last elections of 2012) in successfulness of non-parliamentary subjects, which – along with the fact that also in local elections considerable differences appear in successfulness of parliamentary parties according to the size groups of municipalities, spurs a question whether (to what extent) there is/is not a correlation between successfulness of non-parliamentary subjects in local and regional elections in diverse regions of the Czech Republic. In general, in larger municipalities in local elections an institutionalised independent local lists are more successful than non-institutionalised lists of independents; for instance Jüptner (2008: 27-30) classifies the parties acting at the local level into three types: a) local municipal parties; b) general municipal parties; c) regional parties.

<sup>5</sup> We may speak of the singularity of local politics in larger cities and, and even more – an analysis of the outcomes of local elections in regional cities also confirms that such cities develop in different ways and also this group exhibits certain specifics (in the level of electoral participation, successfulness of non-parliamentary parties, and so on). (Šaradín 2003: 47; Novotný – Tacheci 2013)

factors? Providing it is impossible to draw an unambiguous conclusion regarding the relation between the size of municipality and a local party system nationalisation, what other factors affect the level of nationalisation to the largest extent?

The main research question of the following text thus examines the relation between local party system nationalisation (dependent variable) and independent variables with the size of municipality in their centre. The analysis employs aggregate data from the 2010 local elections in the Czech Republic (or Czechia) in an array of 205 Czech municipalities with extended powers and the capital city of Prague (thus a sub-array of all the 6,250 municipalities in the Czech Republic). The selection of such areas as basic analytical units has taken into account a considerably fragmented structure of settlement in the Czech Republic (see below). In its methodology, the submitted thesis draws on the conceptualization of local party system nationalisation introduced by Danish political scientists Ulrik Kjær and Jørgen Elklit (2010), whilst we have attempted to outline possibilities as well as conceivable limits of this concept when implanting it in a different environment.

## **Theory and methods**

### ***The party system nationalisation***

Within the scope of research of multi-level governance, the party system nationalisation accentuating significance of spatial aspects for an overall institutionalisation of party systems has progressed to the forefront of interest. (Jones – Mainwaring 2003; Caramani 2004; Chhibber – Kollman 2004; Bochsler 2006; Kasuya – Moenius 2008; Bochsler 2010; Harbers 2010; in Czech environment – Kouba 2007; Strmiska et al. 2009; Lyons – Linek 2010)<sup>6</sup> Party system nationalisation may be defined as an extent within which individual parties evenly compete in different regions and thus it points at an uneven electoral gain across a territory of the state. (Kouba 2007: 1022) Differences between different degrees of nationalisation then impact both political strategies of individual actors and electoral behaviour as well as the patterns of political race. (Jones – Mainwaring 2003: 140)<sup>7</sup> For the time being, however, the study of party system nationalisation in Central and Eastern European countries still represents rather a marginalized item of political research. (Strmiska et al. 2009: 107) Besides, most literature

---

<sup>6</sup> One of the first authors who as early as in the 1960s sought to measure the extent of nationalisation was Donald Stokes (1967), who compared a degree of localism via the distribution of voting into three constituents: national, state and local; subsequently, he analyzed to what extent party support varies among individual territorial units in the elections in Great Britain and the United States.

<sup>7</sup> For comparison of the main concepts of a nationalisation of party systems and their characteristics, see Strmiska et al. 2009: 17-31.

addressing this topic and regardless of the choice of research area, almost entirely centres on the similarities of party systems in the elections to national parliaments and differences in the distribution of support for individual parties across geographic and administrative units. (Jones – Mainwaring 2003; Caramani 2004; Bochslers 2006; Bochslers 2010; Harbers 2010)<sup>8</sup> In general, we may encounter three directions in the research of nationalisation in the literature. The first one, *dynamic nationalisation*, analyses the level of variation of party support amidst territorial units in time. The second one, *distributional nationalisation*, focuses on the extent to which there exists an even distribution of party support across territorial units. Finally, the third direction represented by *party-linkage nationalisation* monitors the extent to which the candidates link under common party brands, i.e. the process of party aggregation. (Schakel 2013: 212-214)

What has so far remained almost entirely outside a research interest is an analysis of interconnectedness between local party systems and their (supra)system level formed by a national party system, i.e. the extent of expansion of parliamentary parties to the local level<sup>9</sup>. However, an extension of the research of nationalisation to the level of local party systems entails several problems. The first one of them afflicts the concept of nationalisation itself, having been framed primarily for single-level employment. (Strmiska et al. 2009: 109) Moreover, other authors assert that in case of local party systems a fundamental question is the nationalisation of individual local party systems and not the degree of approximation of (sub)national electoral patterns vis-à-vis a national pattern. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 441) Nevertheless, an issue of including local areas as independent levels of analysis appears to be of the highest significance. Unlike a national level with an extent of nationalisation examined within one area, at a local level the extent of nationalisation is assessed among areas, which yields a number of problems when assessing an extent of nationalisation of individual parties or an extent of nationalisation of all the local levels. The most serious problem is the fact that until recently there was no adequate analytical tool available to describe similarities between local party systems and a national party system. Application of the tools to research the nationalisation at the national level, with – for instance – the Gini coefficient as one of the commonly used research tools, is rendered difficult by the fact that the level score of such indicators is the weighted (through the gain

---

<sup>8</sup> A book by Maximilián Strmiska and his colleagues represent one of few exceptions; they analyzed an extent of nationalisation, in their terminology the level of horizontal territorial integration, in the countries of the Visegrad Four in a multi-level perspective at the national level as well as in regional elections and elections to the European Parliament. (cf. Strmiska et al. 2009: 107-129)

<sup>9</sup> In contrast, influence of the national level of politics on the form of administrative structures at the local level in the Czech Republic (Illner 1999) as well as Slovakia (Klimovský 2008; Mihálik – Klimovský 2014) has undergone a certain observation.

of political parties) sum of individual scores acquired by political parties in the scrutinized units of analysis. The construction of indicators based on the Gini coefficient, for instance the so-called *Party Nationalisation Score* (PNS) introduced by the U.S. political scientists Jones and Mainwaring (2003) in their study analysing the party system nationalisation in the countries of North, Central and South America, would thus in its employment at the local level identify “only” the value of a nationalisation score aggregated at the level of summary of all the local areas, which would not only conceal the extent of local party system nationalisation in specific municipalities, but also limit the possibility to locate determinants of such differences<sup>10</sup>.

Similarly, employment of any other tools introduced by other authors for the research of nationalisation does not bring any solution. The concept of *party aggregation* coined by Chhibber and Kollman (1998) as well as a two-dimensional concept of party nationalisation (based on the dimensions of *inflation* and *dispersion*) constructed by Kasuya and Moenius (2008) draw on the so-called effective number of parties in their calculation, i.e. an indicator developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to measure fragmentation of party systems. Even when discarding the criticism of this extensively used tool in comparative politics (for instance, its overestimation of influence of large parties or the fact that a different distribution of electoral gains of political parties may eventuate in identical values of fragmentation (see, e.g., Golosov 2010: 172-176))<sup>11</sup>, the main shortcoming of this tool persists – the fact that comparison of the extent of fragmentation of the entire electoral level against an aggregate of the parts of this level comes to one resultant value of nationalisation. At the same time, the calculation of an effective number of parties fails to differentiate between parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties and only exposes the extent of similarities and dissimilarities in the level of fragmentation, regardless of an identity of competing subjects, which is a factor of high importance within the context of our study. All the aforementioned works, or the indicators and concepts used by the authors to measure an extent of nationalisation are concurrently established on an analysis of the votes to national parliaments only and in their construction completely ignore other (sub)national levels where an electoral race materializes as well,

<sup>10</sup> Problem with applying the Gini coefficient in the research of nationalisation may be demonstrated on the study of Strmiska et al. which introduces interesting findings concerning the extent of nationalisation (or a horizontal territorial integration); nonetheless, it facilitates comparisons among different levels (national, regional, European), but not within such aggregates. (cf. Strmiska et al. 2009: 114-129) For further problems connected with an employment of the Gini coefficient in empirical research, see for instance Deltas (2003).

<sup>11</sup> Many authors have focused on the criticism of construction of Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) index of an effective number of parties; they have endeavoured to present an alternative construction of this indicator. (e.g. Molinar 1991; Dunleavy – Boucek 2003; Golosov 2010) However, each of such indexes exhibits its strengths and weaknesses, so the original Laakso and Taagepera's version of index still nowadays remains the most frequently used tool to measure the fragmentation of party systems.

which Schakel (2013: 214) labels as the so-called ‘methodological nationalism bias’.

Some of the few authors who have attempted to incorporate a (sub)national level of governance into their analysis of nationalisation were Gibson and Suarez-Cao (2010) who analyzed an extent of nationalisation in Argentina between national (federal presidential elections) and (sub)national (provincial governors elections) levels. Nonetheless, also their analysis was founded on the comparison of fragmentation of party systems at national and (sub)national levels utilizing Laakso and Taagepera’s index of an effective number of parties; thus, the aforementioned objections apply to the works by these authors as well. Attempts by Arjan Schakel (2013) might bring a certain solution; he (among others) applied a *dissimilarity index* in his analysis of nationalisation in multi-level system (between national and regional levels) which in its calculation takes into account the sum of differences between electoral gains of the parties at national and regional levels. (For more details, see Schakel 2013: 220) This index (like the aforementioned indexes), however, draws on an analysis of the share of votes gained by the parties, which to a large extent puts aside (in our opinion) very crucial findings concerning the fact that when comparing different levels of government possibly with diverse types of electoral systems it may be much more important to view the level of representation (the number of seats) of individual parties rather than a “mere” survey of the gained number of votes. This particularly applies to the research of nationalisation at the local level with the participation (especially in the Czech Republic) of a large number of subjects which do not take part in the race at the national level.

Danish political scientists Ulrik Kjær and Jørgen Elklit (2010) sought to resolve this methodological problem; they introduced an index of local party system nationalisation constructed directly for the local level. The authors aimed to describe the way how to delineate local party systems with respect to a national party system. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 431) The findings whether identical parties are present and relevant in each area of race constitute one of the most significant measures of congruence as such information indicates existence of similar basic political disputes and their organizational expression. (Thorlakson 2006: 47-48)

#### ***Kjær – Elklit’s index of local party system nationalisation***

While indexes of nationalisation used to measure national party system nationalisation work with the shares of votes which individual parties obtained at the level of scrutinized units, Kjær and Elklit in the conceptualization of their index regard the number of political parties, or the size of their representation as one of the crucial dimensions of party system. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 429-430)

According to Kjær and Elklit an integration of two key dimensions represents the basic decision when constructing an indicator of local party system nationalisation: 1) absence/presence of non-partisan lists (i.e. the lists of coalition of non-partisan candidates or local parties); 2) absence/presence of 'national' parties in a specific local party system. As both dimensions do not necessarily overlap the authors deem it impossible to measure the extent of local party system nationalisation employing one of them only, and thus a need arises to apply the indicators of both dimensions when describing the extent of nationalisation as well as an integrated measure of local party system nationalisation, which connects these two dimensions. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 432) The authors perceive three indicators characterizing the form of a local party system in a given municipality as crucial: a) share of running/represented national parties; b) share of running/represented local parties; c) index of local party system nationalisation. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 433-434) Based on such indicators six dependent variables may be constructed (for an overview of dependent variables see Table 1 below):

- 1) ***share of national parties running***: as the share of the number of running national parties in a specific municipality and the total number of national parties (variable *NP-running*);
- 2) ***share of local parties running***: as the share of the number of running local parties in a specific municipality and the total number of running parties in this municipality, both national and local (variable *LP-running*);
- 3) ***index of local party system nationalisation at the level of candidacy***: as the share of the number of running national parties in a specific municipality and the maximum possible number of running parties, both local and national – in case all the national parties would run in the elections in a given municipality (variable *I-running*);
- 4) ***share of national parties represented***: as the share of the number of represented national parties in a specific municipality and the total number of national parties (variable *NP-represented*);
- 5) ***share of local parties represented***: as the share of the number of represented local parties in a specific municipality and the total number of represented parties in this municipality, both national and local (variable *LP-represented*);
- 6) ***index of local party system nationalisation at the level of representation***: as the share of the number of represented national parties in a specific municipality and the maximum possible number of running parties, both local and national – in case all the national parties would run in the elections in a given municipality (variable *I-represented*). (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 433-434)



The resultant values of the index of local party system nationalisation range between 0 and 1. The index assumes the value 0 when none of the national parties is running, or has failed to gain representation in a given municipality in local elections; value 1 is attained when only national parties are running, or have gained representation in the municipal council. Based on empirical verification, Kjær and Elklit (2010) demonstrate that an inclusion of both dimensions (the share of running national parties and the share of running local parties) into the index is justified as they both are part of the conceptualization of local party systems nationalisation. The index attributes the same weight to both dimensions – high values of the share of running national parties affect the index the same way as the low occurrence of local parties and *vice versa*, and a calculated lower to medium value of the correlation of both dimensions ( $r = -0.25$ ) concurrently confirms that the monitored dimensions do not significantly overlap. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 433-434)<sup>12</sup>

In the next step – constructing an *effective index of local party system nationalisation*, the authors address a possible criticism that a mere gain of representation in the municipal council does not imply anything about its size. The basic idea behind the construction of this indicator is an assumption that when the national parties that are relatively large (on national scale) are absent from a local party system the extent of local party system nationalisation is lower than in case there are no smaller national parties. In compliance with the same logic a higher level of nationalisation may be anticipated in the municipalities where local parties gain only a limited number of seats than in case they dispose of a considerable share of elected representatives. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 435)

Acknowledging such assumptions, the authors modify the three above stated indicators (and dependent variables) characterizing the form of a local party system so that they reflect a different size of representation of individual subjects, both at national and local levels:

- 7) *effective share of national parties represented*: share of the total number of seats in the national parliament carried by national parties which have simultaneously gained representation in a specific municipality (variable *EI[NP]-represented*);
- 8) *effective share of local parties represented*: share of the total number of seats in the municipal council of a specific municipality gained by local parties (variable *EI[LP]-represented*);

---

<sup>12</sup> The fact that both dimensions do not mutually strongly correlate is also confirmed by our analysis, as a detected correlation of both dimensions at the level of units of our observance in the 2010 local elections in the Czech Republic was even weaker ( $r = -0.089$ ).

- 9) *effective index of local party system nationalisation*: share of the number of seats in the municipal council gained by national parties divided by the share of seats in the national parliament carried by the parties with no representation in the municipality + 1 (variable *EI[LPSN]*). (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 435-436)<sup>13</sup>

Construction of the index thus facilitates its employment in the comparisons involving different political levels within one state as well as different states, both in one point of time as well as long-term perspective. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 440) Prior to the analysis itself, though, it is advisable to consider all the possible limits of this concept when implanting it in (not only) a Czech environment as one of the fundamental problems of comparative political research are the problems incurred in the attempts to apply the concepts developed in one area in the environment of different areas.

An undisputed advantage of the indicators pioneered by Kjær and Elklit (2010) is the fact that their construction allows for an identification of different extents of nationalisation at the level of individual local party systems and not only in the aggregate of such systems. Therefore, it offers a possibility to assess not only the level of interconnectedness between individual local party systems and their (supra)system level as well as an opportunity to test other hypotheses addressing the reasons for different extents of nationalisation in specific municipalities, with regard to different sizes of municipalities or any other factors affecting voter behaviour in the elections. Furthermore, such indicators may potentially serve as independent variables in other analyses.

Apart from the advantages, however, a variety of issues accompany the presented concept. The first issue, which the authors themselves point to, concerns a definition of a national party system, or the question – which parties to incorporate into the system. A problem may arise from the situation when a national party system has undergone transformation in the course of an electoral period, as may be well demonstrated on the case of the Czech Republic. Four identical parties (ODS, ČSSD, KSČM, KDU-ČSL) always won a parliamentary representation in four elections to the lower house of the parliament (Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic) in

---

<sup>13</sup> Idea which an equation for the calculation of an effective index of local party system nationalisation draws on, is identical with the way an equation for the calculation of its non-effective version was constructed. The index is a ratio of the number of seats in municipal council, acquired by national parties as the share of a “potential size” of the council, if unrepresented national parties obtained the same ratio of seats in the council corresponding to the size of their representation in the national parliament. Therefore, a denominator in the equation equals one plus the ratio of seats in the national parliament, which the parties without representation dispose of in a given municipality. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 442) In a formalized version a formula for the calculation of an effective index of local party system nationalisation would be as follows:  $EI(LPSN) = (x / y) + 1$ , where  $x$  represents a share of seats in the council obtained by national parties and  $y$  indicates a share of the number of seats in the national parliament maintained by the parties which failed to acquire representation in the municipality.

the years 1996 – 2006<sup>14</sup>. In each election, however, they were supplemented by at least one more political party<sup>15</sup>. The elections in the years 2010 and 2013 brought even a more remarkable change. In the parliamentary elections held in 2010, KDU-ČSL for the first time failed to secure its representation in the lower house (the Green Party lost it after one electoral period) and two new parties entered the parliament (TOP09, VV)<sup>16</sup>. In the elections of 2013, KDU-ČSL returned to the parliament, a “newcomer” from the year 2010 TOP 09 maintained its representation, but instead of VV – leaving the parliament after one electoral period, two new formations ANO 2011 and Dawn of Direct Democracy of Tomio Okamura entered the lower house. (See Stegmaier – Vlachová 2011; Stegmaier – Linek 2014)

In this case, Kjær and Elklit (2010) emphasize that in the question of whether to include or not the parties which have lost their parliamentary representation into the calculations it is not critical which option we shall choose; however, once we have made the choice it is important in the following work with the index to stay consistent in time or in comparisons among different states. In their text analyzing the outcomes of Danish local elections held in 2001, Kjær and Elklit (2010: 434-435) opted to include into the national system of political parties two parties which lost their parliamentary representation at the time, reasoning that despite the loss of their representation the character of these parties will continue to be primarily national. At the same time, this problem does not only constitute a problem with what parties to include into a national system of political parties; it also impacts a construction of the indexes of nationalisation.

Immediacy of the problem in particular emerges in the attempts to apply the presented concept in the post-communist area of Central and Eastern Europe, featured by a lower stability and closeness of party systems and on the other hand a frequent (in many cases quite significant, yet not always lasting) entry of new actors into national party systems. (cf. Sikk 2005) It is, therefore, impossible to apply the solution employed by Kjær and Elklit in new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. They demarcated as national such Danish parties that at the time of local elections were simultaneously registered for the participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections. (Kjær – Elklit 2010: 430-431) Should we employ an analogous solution in the Czech Republic and define as national all the parties which participated in the parliamentary elections of 2010 (almost five months prior to the local

---

<sup>14</sup> ODS: Civic Democratic Party; ČSSD: Czech Social Democratic Party; KSČM: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; KDU-ČSL: Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party.

<sup>15</sup> The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and the Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) in 1992 and 1996, the Union of Liberty (US) in 1998, the Union of Liberty – Democratic Union (US-DEU) in coalition with the KDU-ČSL in 2002, or the Green Party (SZ) in 2006.

<sup>16</sup> TOP09: Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09; VV: Public Affairs.

elections), they would amount to 27 subjects, the majority of which are quite marginal parties, not successful in local elections either. For instance, 16 of them reached less than 1% of votes in the parliamentary elections of 2010. On the other hand, an analysis restricted only to the parties currently (on the day of local elections) disposing of parliamentary representation is not an ideal solution, either, as may be exemplified on the case of KDU-ČSL.

Should we stop considering KDU-ČSL to be a national party only due to the loss of its parliamentary representation in the elections of 2010 (KDU-ČSL lost representation in the lower house for the first time since 1920 and already in 2013 re-assumed the representation), we would ignore the fact that as far as the representation at the local level is concerned, KDU-ČSL has ranked among the most successful parties. (cf. Balík 2009: 139-162) For this reason we consider it suitable to opt for the solution embraced by Danish authors as well, i.e. to treat as national parties also such subjects which could lose their parliamentary representation in the period preceding local elections. At the same time, however, we may not regard as national parties simply any subjects which have disposed of parliamentary representation some time throughout the history. For this reason we deem it necessary to stipulate a criterion which would on one hand take into account the period in which the party lost its representation and on the other hand the period when a given subject disposed of this representation. Accordingly, we will consider such parties to be national parties which: a) dispose of parliamentary representation at the time of local elections; b) the parties which lost their parliamentary representation in the elections which preceded the local elections following afterwards, but in the previous period had disposed of three (uninterrupted) representations in the national parliament<sup>17</sup>.

We are aware of the fact that such a solution is not ideal either, as for instance in case of the parties newly admitted to the parliament it is uncertain whether they will maintain their representation (as may be illustrated on a different fate of TOP 09 and VV); nevertheless, any other solutions would confront us with even more burdensome methodological dilemmas. Which other adequate criteria to choose, apart from the aforementioned ones, to classify the parties into a national party system? The representation in the upper house of the parliament? Then we would have to regard as parliamentary parties also miscellaneous smaller subjects which manage to succeed locally primarily owing to a majority character of electoral system for the upper house of the Czech parliament. Public support with set boundaries attained in election polls or, for example, an outcome of elections guaranteeing political parties

---

<sup>17</sup> In the remaining part of the text the terms parliamentary parties and national parties shall be used as synonyms for the parties fulfilling the above stated criteria, i.e. ODS, ČSSD, KSČM, KDU-ČSL, TOP09, VV. In total, therefore, we include six parties into the national system of political parties.

state benefits designated for party's activities? Then we would face a hardly defensible decision why we have counted such a party to be national which has barely attained the given one percent of votes and not the party whose support has fallen "only" one hundredth percent under this limit. Besides, the limits for the award of state benefits may alter in time, as a Czech case well illustrates. For this reason we opt for the two criteria defined above.

Our solution, which Kjær and Elklit (2010) applied in their work as well, entails another problem; it directly concerns the construction of indexes of nationalisation. While in case of non-effective version of indexes no serious problem arises (we simply place the number of national parties according to our selected definition into the calculation of dependent variables *NP-running*, *LP-running*, *I-running*, *NP-represented*, *LP-represented*, *I-represented*), a more intricate situation emerges in case of effective versions of indexes (dependent variables *EI[NP]*, *EI[LP]*, *EI[LPSN]*). Their construction takes into consideration not only the number of national parties, but also an extent of their parliamentary representation (the number of seats in the parliament). However, provided we regard as national such parties as well which in the period of local elections do not dispose of parliamentary representation (in our case – KDU-ČSL) then we artificially underestimate the resultant values of nationalisation<sup>18</sup>. For this reason we consider a possibility to pursue an alternative solution – in particular, not to work with the number of seats of parties in the parliament, but instead replace them with the share of votes which the parties classified as national acquired in the parliamentary elections, recounted to 100%, so that the total of their votes represented 100%, similarly as if all the subjects classified as national (i.e. also those without a current parliamentary representation) disposed of such a representation<sup>19</sup>.

Finally, the third problem is stirred by the question how to tackle the parliamentary parties running at a local level within various coalition groups. For instance, in the Czech local elections of 2010 in 206 monitored municipalities, national parties were running in the total of 45 municipalities within various coalition groups (i.e. 21.84%). In our opinion, the most appropriate solution is to incorporate into the calculations as national parties only such subjects which ran independently in the local elections, or their name was directly integrated into the title of candidate's list; the candidate's title thus did not conceal a concrete identity of such subjects. A more complicated situation arises when there appears more than one parliamentary party on one candidate's list (or more precisely, directly in the title of candidate's list). In

<sup>18</sup> Kjær and Elklit (2010) do not explicitly offer a solution to this problem (i.e. how to incorporate the parties which have lost their parliamentary representation into the calculations of seats in the national parliament).

<sup>19</sup> We are aware of the problem of a potential distortion incurred by the given setup of an electoral system (a 5% threshold, various sizes of electoral districts, D'Hondt electoral divisor), inducing a share of votes which is not quite identical with the resulting share of seats; however, in regards to the aim of our work we do not consider this distortion to be significant.

our case there was only one such municipality, where TOP09 and VV submitted a joint candidate's list. Under such circumstances we advise to differentiate in the calculations the question of candidacy and own representation. In case of candidacy we will perceive both parties as if they have run individually, but in case of representation will be crucial who has actually won the representation.

## **Data**

The submitted analysis works with the election outcomes in Czech 205 municipalities with extended powers and the capital city of Prague. The choice of such municipalities as basic analytical units takes into account a considerably fragmented structure of settlement in the Czech Republic. It is characterized by a large number of small unintegrated municipalities, resulting in an extreme fragmentation of settlement system, reproduced in the equally fragmented structure of the local system of government. (Illner 2003)

The outcomes of the researches held earlier at the same time demonstrated that possibilities of a direct application of some theories of a political science (derived primarily from the practice of higher level politics) on the reality of local politics are significantly limited by the size of local political systems placed in an analysis. (Bubeníček 2006: 741) According to some other authors it is the very size of municipalities which determines a functional model of local politics. (Jüptner 2008: 32) For this reason it is meaningless to work with the smallest categories of municipalities lacking some aspects of classic political systems and with no classic theories of political partisanship and political race functioning there (cf. Jüptner 2004: 84-90); furthermore, we may encounter supremacy of one-party or two-party formats of party systems here. (cf. Hoskovec – Balík 2010: 32-45)

By contrast, municipalities with extended powers represent natural centres of micro regions, to a certain extent serving in their districts as local "models". (Balík 2008a: 9) Municipalities with extended powers (including Prague) on one hand include only 3.3% of all the Czech and Moravian municipalities, but on the other hand they contain nearly all the cities in the Czech Republic numbering more than 10,000 inhabitants; almost three fifths (56.56%) of all inhabitants reside in them and it is unthinkable to select a more homogenous group of municipalities with so many members. The number of municipalities with extended powers, in total 206 including Prague, is also sufficient for an application of quantitative methods.

Dependent variables employed in our work represent the aforementioned indicators of local party system nationalisation, clearly summarized in the following table.

**Table 1: List of dependent variables**

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Level of analysis</b>
NP-running	Share of national parties running in local elections	Level of candidacy
LP-running	Share of local parties running in local elections	
I-running	Index of local party system nationalisation at the level of candidacy	
NP-represented	Share of national parties with representation in local councils	Level of representation
LP-represented	Share of local parties with representation in local councils	
I-represented	Index of local party system nationalisation at the level of representation	
EI(NP)	Effective share of national parties with representation in local councils	Level of representation (effective)
EI(LP)	Effective share of local parties with representation in local councils	
EI(LPSN)	Effective index of local party system nationalisation	

Sources: CZSO – Public Database; own calculations.

In the selection process of independent variables we are greatly limited by the fact that the research of local party systems nationalisation and determinants of different extents of nationalisation amidst municipalities is quite an unresearched topic, with an exception of work by Kjær and Elklit (2010). It is then very challenging to define independent variables on a theoretical basis; therefore, our work rather displays explorative nature, except for the factor of the size of municipality whose independent influence on many aspects of a local political process was mentioned in an introductory part of the text.

In view of the foregoing, and the fact that our aim is to control the influence of the municipality size, we choose such independent variables that should characterize both the structure of the population of the municipality as well as the local social context (social climate); i.e. variables which are characteristic for two basic theoretical approaches used, for instance, in a spatial analysis of voting behaviour – composite and contextual approach. (cf. Kostecký – Čermák 2004: 469-472)<sup>20</sup>

For that reason, the choice of independent variables is to a large extent based on the so-called sociological model, which, in explaining voters' behaviour, focuses on the analysis of voting behaviour of objectively identifiable social groups, i.e. the groups of long-term structuring effects. According to some authors, a sociological model can be used for both national (the first-order), but also for the other type of elections (the second-order elections). Although we can find some variations at these “lower“ levels, they are not so large that it would be impossible to describe voter profiles using the

<sup>20</sup> Kostecký (1995: 62-64) points out usefulness of mutual combination of both approaches, and at the same time specifies that when working with aggregate data composite and contextual types of explanation may not be rigorously discerned as the character of aggregate data eliminates an exact determination which of the two approaches is closer to the truth.

sociological model. (Plecitá-Vlachová 2001: 87) Similarly, one of the branches of sociological model also includes the analysis of the social context in which people find themselves, regardless of their personal characteristics or belonging to social groups. (Evans 2004: 46-47)

The final set of independent variables then includes a municipal size and other variables that describe the differences in structure of the population, settlement and economic structure of each municipality. We use variables, which previous studies identified as significant determinants of voter behaviour in the Czech Republic. (Kostecký – Čermák 2004; Linek 2004; Lebeda et al. 2006; Hloušek – Kopeček 2008; Linek 2010a; Smith – Matějů 2011; Linek – Lyons 2013; Maškarinec 2013; Maškarinec – Bláha 2014) Certain restrictions, which determined the choice of independent variables, also related to the availability of data at the level of aggregation.

The data set of socioeconomic indicators for 206 units of analysis was compiled from two basic sources: the decennial population census of 2011 (SLDB 2011), and other Czech Statistical Office statistics (CZSO – Public Database). The basic independent variable is a municipality size. Given that the monitored data set contains several municipalities whose population greatly exceeds the remaining municipalities, the logarithm to the number of inhabitants is used as a measure of municipality size; Kjær and Elklit (2010) employed the same procedure.

Socioeconomic status as the main source of structural cleavage of Czech politics is expressed as *unemployment* (proportion of the unemployed population) and the number of *self-employed* per 1,000 inhabitants<sup>21</sup>. The other independent variables represent the most common bases of stratification: *higher education* (proportion of people with tertiary education), *retirement* (proportion of the population aged 65 and over), Catholicism (proportion of the Roman Catholics). Then, we added two other variables, which may partly (but certainly not entirely) characterize the influence of local political culture: *turnout* (proportion of voters participating in local elections) and *competitiveness* (proportion of the number of candidates to the number of seats in a particular municipality). Most of the Czech studies had confirmed a significant impact of municipality size on turnout, although this relationship is not completely linear. (Kostecký 2005; Balík 2008a) For this reason, the turnout is possibly regarded as one of the indicators of civic participation in local politics. For instance, Ryšavý and Šaradín (2011: 31) argue that it cannot be ruled out that voter turnout, as well as competitiveness, are common

---

<sup>21</sup> Level of unemployment is a crucial indicator of an economic situation of the municipality as it impacts a local labour market, whereby it affects an objective position as well as subjective perception of the situation of inhabitants who are employed. (Kostecký 2001: 22) On the other hand, the level of unemployment reflects not only the character of an economic situation, but also it serves as an indicator of a social quality of inhabitants. (Blažek – Csank 2007: 948)



manifestations of local political participation relating to the overall climate in the municipality and the level of its civic development. Similarly, other authors (Jančák et al. 2008; Pileček – Jančák 2010) argue that voter turnout is (in local elections) a fundamental indicator of social capital, and when working with aggregated data at the local level, it is one of a few such indicators available. The use of both indicators also enables the fact that a positive correlation between competitiveness and voter turnout in Czech municipalities was neither linear nor too strong. (Ryšavý – Šaradín 2011: 30-32)

**Table 2: List of independent variables and descriptive statistics**

<b>Independent variable</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Mean (standard deviation)</b>
Municipality size (log)	The logarithm to the number of inhabitants	4.17 (0.39)
Unemployment	So-called registered unemployment rate (proportion of the number of job seekers and the number of economically active population)	10.61 (3.06)
Self-employment	Number of self-employed persons per 1,000 inhabitants	89 (32.32)
Higher education	Share of college graduates in the population aged 15+	11.14 (3.40)
Retirement	Share of persons aged 65+ in the population	16.18 (1.57)
Catholicism	Share of the Roman Catholics in the population	10.03 (6.77)
Turnout	Share of voters (those who have been issued an official envelope) and registered voters (persons listed in the electoral rolls)	44.60 (6.13)
Competitiveness	Share of the number of candidates to the number of seats in a particular municipality	8.73 (2.41)

Sources: CZSO – Public Database, SLDB 2011; own calculations.

The effects of the above mentioned indicators were analysed using the classic ordinary least squares method (multiple linear regression). The results of each regression model are indicated by two basic parameters, namely unstandardized regression coefficients (B; measuring the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable when controlled for all other variables, it tells us how much the dependent variable changes per unit change in the independent variable), and adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted *R*-squared; measuring the overall performance of the model in explaining variance in the dependent variable). Model 1 tests the effects of municipal size only, while Model 2 tests the effects of all independent variables (including municipal size) to verify the robustness of the findings.

## Determinants of local party system nationalisation

Regression models explaining local party system nationalisation were not generally too successful. With regard to three monitored levels of analysis (level of candidacy, level of representation, level of representation in an effective version), the proportion of an explained variability reached in the best case 49% (dependent variable *LP-running*, Model 2) or rather 29% (dependent variable *I-represented*, Model 2) or 19% (dependent variable *EI[LP]*, Model 2). Nevertheless, in some cases it was nearing to zero. (See Tables 3-5) If we look at the position of individual independent variables, only some of them have proved as statistically significant: the size of a municipality (in eleven out of eighteen models) and competitiveness (in seven out of nine models), while from the others, only variables such as higher education and self-employment or rather retirement were in a few cases statistical significant (in two or rather one out of nine models).

If we focus on individual models, we can see that on the level of candidacy (Table 3), a growing size of municipalities leads to the rise of a number of candidate entities, not only parliamentary but also local ones where the proportion of an explained variability oscillates between 15% to 49%. Contrary to that, in case of the index of nationalisation, we can observe completely opposite logic. There, with the rise of the population in municipalities, local party system nationalisation decreases. With respect to the interpretation, it is necessary to emphasize that in case of this index exactly, an explained variance reaches only 6% (Model 1) or rather 17% (Model 2). If we try to offer a possible explanation of the discrepancy between the individual models, it is possible to come up with two possible hypotheses. The first one is connected with a distinctive transformation of the national party system after the elections into the Czech Chamber of Deputies in 2010, when two „newcomers“ (TOP09 and VV) entered the parliament. They did not have sufficiently developed organisational structure in a number of municipalities during the period of the local elections. And thus they were not able to build there their own lists of candidates<sup>22</sup>. The second (subsequent) possible explanation is connected with the following discovered finding: bigger the municipality, bigger the participation of the local entities in the local elections. Missing anchorage of TOP09 and VV on the local level on one hand, and considerable willingness of various local entities to participate in the local elections in bigger towns on the other hand, thus can be explaining a negative relation found between the size of a municipality and the index of local party system nationalisation on the level

---

<sup>22</sup> From the total of 206 monitored municipalities, all six national parties ran only in 90 municipalities, whereas five parties ran in 74 municipalities, four parties in 34 municipalities, three in seven municipalities and only two parties in one municipality.

of candidacy. The significance of the influence of the size of a municipality is disappearing in overall models (Models 2), where on the contrary, an independent influence of competitiveness appears, and in one case retirement variable appears, too. But in fact, the rise of competitiveness, similarly as in Model 1, is logically related to the rise of candidate entities (not only national, but also local ones). Contrary to that, the relation is changing into a negative one in case of the index of nationalisation, once again as in the Model 1. Retirement variable as the last statistically significant variable influencing candidacy causes negative effect only in the direction of decrease of candidates of national parties. Nevertheless, its influence is very weak.

Table 3: **Czech Local Party System Nationalisation** (level of candidacy), 2010

Independent variable	Dependent variable					
	Share of national parties running in local elections		Share of local parties running in local elections		Index of local party system nationalization	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Municipality size (log)	<b>0.146***</b>	0.037	<b>0.152***</b>	-0.019	<b>-0.085***</b>	0.020
Unemployment	-	-0.004	-	0.003	-	-0.003
Self-employment	-	-0.001	-	0.000	-	-0.001
Higher education	-	0.000	-	0.004	-	-0.003
Retirement	-	<b>-0.013*</b>	-	-0.006	-	0.011
Catholicism	-	0.001	-	-0.002	-	0.001
Turnout	-	0.002	-	-0.002	-	0.003
Competitiveness	-	<b>0.031***</b>	-	<b>0.037***</b>	-	<b>-0.020***</b>
Constant						
N	206	206	206	206	206	206
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	<b>0.154</b>	<b>0.305</b>	<b>0.199</b>	<b>0.492</b>	<b>0.061</b>	<b>0.169</b>

Sources: CZSO – Public Database, SLDB 2011; own calculations.

Note: Statistical significant values are in bold, level of significance: \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ , \*:  $p < 0.05$ .

If we move on to the regression models explaining differences in representation of national parties and local entities in the local councils of individual municipalities (Table 4), we observe above all in the first step a total fail rate of the model clarifying success rate of national parties on the local level. And not only with regard to an explained variance of Models 1 and 2, but also with regard to the fact that neither the size of a municipality, nor any from the other independent variables proved to be statistically significant. Noticeably better results are offered in the models where other dependent variables are entering. These variables are the share of represented local parties and the index of local party system nationalisation on the level of representation. In the first case, the success rate of the models oscillates between 5% (Model 1) and

24% (Model 2), meanwhile in the second one, between 14% (Model 1) and 29% (Model 2). With respect to the presence of local entities in municipal councils, it is confirmed that its success rate decreases with a growing size of municipalities. And that is mainly in Model 2 where the population of municipalities understood as another variable with independent influence is joined by competitiveness and by self-employment. The last two variables mentioned, on the contrary, strengthen a number of representing local entities in spite of the fact that their influence, in comparison with the size of municipalities, is much weaker (especially in case of self-employment variable). Contrary to the theoretical assumptions, the growth of a number of inhabitants does not manifest itself by a growing rate of the index of nationalisation. By contrast, we can observe negative influence of the size of municipalities on the figures of the index (Model 1). However, the obtained relation disappears in the overall model (Model 2), where on the contrary, competitiveness works in a negative way. The interpretation of these findings is not that simple. Nevertheless, in our opinion a working hypothesis can be stated. On one hand, together with a growing municipality size, success rate of local political entities decreases altogether. But on the other hand, their frequent candidacy leads to the fact that these entities (with regard to the construction of the index of nationalisation) by their mere presence on lists of candidates significantly influence final figures of this indicator in a negative way.

The last group of regression models is represented by those entered by dependent variables which try to express local party system nationalisation in an effective form (Table 5), i.e. take into consideration the fact that mere presence of individual entities in the municipal council does not testify anything about its size, quite contrary. As shown above, a growing size of municipalities or rather a number of distributed seats provides stimulus for more frequent candidacy of local and independent entities<sup>23</sup>, which can finally influence results of observed indicators. The solution of this problem is taking into consideration an actual extent of representation (a number of obtained seats) which can give more precise answer to the question of relation between local party systems nationalisation and its determinants.

---

<sup>23</sup> Variable a number of seats was eliminated from regression models just before its own analysis because a very strong link was found between the size of municipalities and a number of seats in individual local councils.

Table 4: **Czech Local Party System Nationalisation** (level of representation), 2010

Independent variable	Dependent variable					
	Share of national parties with representation in local councils		Share of local parties with representation in local councils		Index of local party system nationalization	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Municipality size (log)	0.003	-0.032	<b>-0.077**</b>	<b>-0.186***</b>	<b>-0.139***</b>	-0.003
Unemployment		0.003		0.002		0.001
Self-employment		0.000		<b>0.001*</b>		0.000
Higher education		0.006		-0.003		0.000
Retirement		0.003		-0.005		0.005
Catholicism		0.002		-0.001		0.002
Turnout		0.001		-0.001		0.003
Competitiveness		0.006		<b>0.030***</b>		<b>-0.029***</b>
Constant						
N	206	206	206	206	206	206
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	<b>-0.005</b>	<b>0.005</b>	<b>0.047</b>	<b>0.243</b>	<b>0.142</b>	<b>0.291</b>

Sources: CZSO – Public Database, SLDB 2011; own calculations.

Note: Statistical significant values are in bold, level of significance: \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ , \*:  $p < 0.05$ .

Calculation of an effective version of share of national parties which were able to gain representation on the local level indicates a positive association with the growth of population of municipalities. Nevertheless, the explained variability is almost nearing to zero or rather reaches 2% (Model 1). No statistically significant independent variable was then found in the Model 2 (as well as in a non-effective version of this indicator). More successful were remaining regression models where an explained variance oscillates between 8% and 19% (effective proportion of representation of local parties) or rather 7% to 13% (effective index of nationalisation) and at the same time, the logic of influence of independent variables corresponds to the theoretical expectations. The decrease of seat share of local entities is obvious with a growing size of municipalities (far more distinctively than in the case of non-effective version of the indicator which took into consideration only a number of representing entities and not their real power expressed by the number of seats). Similarly, according to the expectations, a change of the direction of influence of the size of a municipality is happening where bigger population of municipalities influences positively the effective index of local party system nationalisation. In fact, the direction of influence of variables does not change in both cases. Not even when other independent variables enter the models (Model 2). Also in these cases, the size of a municipality rests the most powerful determinant of success of local entities and also overall local party

system nationalisation (on contrary to the success of national parties where in the overall Model 2 variable municipality size was not statistically significant). At the same time we can also observe in both models an independent influence of other variables although being much lower influence than in the case of the municipality size. On one hand, success rate of representation of local entities raises competitiveness and on the other hand, it lowers higher proportion of university educated population of municipalities.

Table 5: Czech Local Party System Nationalisation (effective), 2010

Independent variable	Dependent variable					
	Effective share of national parties with representation in local councils		Effective share of local parties with representation in local councils		Effective index of local party system nationalisation	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Municipality size (log)	<b>0.044*</b>	−0.004	<b>−0.132***</b>	<b>−0.159**</b>	<b>0.126***</b>	<b>0.133*</b>
Unemployment		−5.922		0.003		−0.001
Self-employment		0.000		0.001		<b>−0.001*</b>
Higher education		0.004		<b>−0.011*</b>		<b>0.012*</b>
Retirement		−0.001		−0.003		0.003
Catholicism		−0.001		−0.001		0.000
Turnout		0.000		0.002		−0.001
Competitiveness		0.006		<b>0.026***</b>		<b>−0.020**</b>
Constant						
N	206	206	206	206	206	206
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	<b>0.017</b>	<b>−0.001</b>	<b>0.083</b>	<b>0.189</b>	<b>0.071</b>	<b>0.128</b>

Sources: CZSO – Public Database, SLDB 2011; own calculations.

Note: Statistical significant values are in bold, level of significance: \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ , \*:  $p < 0.05$ .

In contrast to that, both variables influence effective index of nationalisation in a completely opposite way. Local party system nationalisation is lower in the municipalities where willingness of different local or independent entities (i.e. citizens) to participate in the administration of public matters increases. And on contrary, local party system nationalisation is higher in the municipalities with more educated population. A number of self-employment then negatively but very restrictively influences nationalisation. If we try to explain the logic of the found relations, it is possible to state a hypothesis which in fact confirms the findings of Ryšavý and Šaradín (2011) presented above. So the fact is that it is possible to consider competitiveness as one of the manifestations of local citizen political participation. The logic of the explanation is the following. A higher level of competitiveness indicates a higher citizen development of municipality and overall more positive climate (view) of citizens on

possibilities of their own political participation; whether it involves a past positive experience in participation in political processes or, on the contrary, a reaction on negative experience with the policy of national parties at the local level. In the municipalities with a higher willingness of citizens to participate politically (meaning more extensive involvement of citizens into political processes and not only participation in elections) we can, on one hand, observe higher success rate of local entities which logically lowers the success rate of national parties or rather willingness of voters to vote for national (mainly parliamentary) parties. It is far more difficult to find the logic of influence of higher education variable. In that case, we would actually also expect that it would work in the accordance with competitiveness. On the contrary, the results show that higher educated structure of the municipality rather helps to the growth of local party system nationalisation, or effective index of local party system nationalisation, respectively. However, also in respect to rather lower influence of this variable, verification of the reasons standing behind the direction of its influence remains as the topic for further research.

### **Concluding remarks and discussion**

The aim of the presented paper was an attempt to analyse determinants of local party system nationalisation. The text focused on the analysis of interconnection of the form of local party systems with the national system of political parties in the Czech Republic in the local elections of 2010 in municipalities with extended powers and the capital city of Prague. We were trying to find the answers to the research questions with the help of the indexes of local party system nationalisation, which introduced Danish political scientists Ulrik Kjær and Jørgen Elklit (2010). We were trying to outline not only possibilities (advantages) of this concept but also its limits when transferred into a different context. In this case the most distinctive problem was the demarcation itself of the national system of political parties or rather which parties should be included among the national parties. This question is particularly delicate in the post-communist area of Central and Eastern Europe which is characterized by bigger instability and fluidity of party systems than in the area of Western Europe. Therefore, we introduced a modified solution to the one used by the Danish authors. And we included as national parties the ones, which during the period of local elections, had at their disposal parliamentary representation or they held this representation for three previous parliamentary terms (continuously).

The analysis itself of the links among the individual indicators of local party system nationalisation, the size of a municipality and other independent variables did not bring completely definite conclusions. The main problem was generally not very high success rate of the models in the extent of an explained

variability. The success rate was generally the highest in the case of local party system nationalisation on the level of candidacy (in the overall models, i.e. Models 2) where it reached 31% and 49% (a share of the national parties running for the elections to a local council, or rather a share of the local parties running for the elections to a local council). On the contrary, in the models where our interest was mainly concentrated, i.e. the ones explaining nationalisation on the level of representation, primarily, overall models were successful again. However, their explaining capacity decreased at maximum to 29% (index of local party system nationalisation on the level of representation), or rather to 19% in the case of their effective version (effective share of local parties with the representation in the local council), where in some cases, a found variance was nearing to zero<sup>24</sup>.

Apart from some exceptions, only the size of a municipality and competitiveness showed as statistically significant among all independent variables. The fact that these independent variables were useful only in some models together with low explaining capacity of models in a number of cases then indicates the following: when trying to explain more adequately the extent of nationalisation on the local level, it will be necessary to look for different indicators than common socio-demographic variables, meaning the ones which can far better characterize a form of the local election race in a specific municipality. Those indicators can be connected with for example specific political culture of a particular municipality or with other indicators of the similar type, which can be left out only with some difficulties (or even not used at all) from the commonly available aggregated data. And the use of those indicators would demand carrying out a specific research on the local level that would be able to identify similar indicators.

If we go back to the results of our analysis, it was confirmed that from the position of the proportion of entities running for the elections, the growth of a number of entities (national and also local ones) running for the elections occurs together with a growing size of a municipality. Nevertheless, this relation was found only in Model 1, whereas in the overall models (Model 2), the influence of this variable disappears at the expense of competitiveness. According to the expectations, an assumption of lower success rate in gaining representation by local entities together with the growth of population of municipalities was confirmed, whereas higher competitiveness had the opposite (positive influence) on their representation. Contrary to that, the model explaining the presence of national parties in local councils showed as completely unsuccessful. We identified the outcomes going against the logic of

---

<sup>24</sup> Kjaer with Elklit (2010) came across a similar problem in their analysis. In their case, regression model of effective index of nationalisation explained 23% or rather 26% of variability, as opposed to what we reached: 7% (Model 1) or rather 13% (Model 2).



the model at the figures of indexes of nationalisation, not only on the level of candidacy but also on the level of representation where the index of local party system nationalisation in both cases negatively influenced a growing size of municipalities (Model 1), or rather competitiveness (Model 2). The interpretation of these findings is not quite easy and it will be necessary to do its further verification. Nevertheless, as a working hypothesis, we expressed, on one hand, the statements connected with the change of the national party system after the parliamentary elections of 2010 and missing anchorage of new parties (TOP09, VV) on the local level. This missing anchorage together with significant willingness of local entities to participate in local elections in bigger towns can be explaining negative relations found. Whereas a descending success rate of local entities has no negligible influence too, especially when we take into consideration how the number of population of municipalities is growing. This success rate with combination of their frequent candidacy in bigger towns leads to the fact that these entities (in respect to the construction of index of nationalisation), by their mere presence in the elections, significantly influence (in a negative way) the final figures of this indicator. The reported results thus indicate that the final figures of these indicators are influenced to a great extent by mere presence of local entities on a list of candidates. And this can lead to a distinctive distortion of the actual extent of local party system nationalisation.

Therefore, Kjær and Elklit (2010) came up with a modified (effective) version of the indicators with an attempt to eliminate this problem. Their aim is to take into consideration the real power of individual entities, not only on the national but also on the local level. Also the outcomes of our regression models indicate that this journey shows itself as the right one. In this case, apart from one exception (overall model of effective share of representation of national parties which was completely unsuccessful), an expected influence of the size of a municipality was confirmed. On one hand a growing size of a municipality enforced an effective representation of national parties (Model 1), but also an extent of an effective index of local party system nationalisation. This is shown not only in the model taking into consideration the size of population of municipalities (Model 1), but also in the overall model (Model 2). On the other hand, a growing size of municipality was decreasing an effective representation of local parties (again in both models). At the same time, an independent influence of other variables was found, when it, in particular during the influence of competitiveness but also the influence of educational structure of municipalities, brought not quite definite conclusions. An effective representation of local entities strengthened competitiveness and on the contrary decreased higher proportion of university educated population of municipalities. Meanwhile, both variables influenced an effective index of

local party system nationalisation in a completely opposite way. Here in a working hypothesis, we associated the influence of competitiveness with the form of local citizen political participation. According to this logic, higher willingness of citizens to participate in politics (meaning more extensive participation of citizens in political processes rather than only participation in the elections) manifests itself by higher extent of competitiveness. This subsequently helps the success rate of the local entities, but at the same time in the next step it decreases the success rate of national parties and therefore influences negatively overall extent of an effective index of local party system nationalisation.

It is more difficult to explain logically the influence of higher education variable. In this case, in our opinion, it is possible to offer two pieces of possible working hypothesis that further research could verify. The first hypothesis is about university educated population that is concentrated in higher proportion in the biggest Czech towns (statutory or district) where election race is almost exclusively dominated by political (very often parliamentary) parties. Whereas, with the decreasing size of municipalities vanishes not only presence and activity of political parties on the local level but also partially (but not in all cases) decreases proportion of university educated population. In this case, for the future it would be convenient to work not only with the indicator of the size of a municipality (in our case taking a logarithm), but rather with dimensional (alternatively specified) types of municipalities serving as the indicator. This indicator could be able to verify whether in the case of relation between the proportion of university educated people and the nationalisation of local party system, it is not more about the consequence of the phenomenon of the so-called ecological fallacy. And that is also with the regard to the fact that more educated citizens are supposed to be politically more active and that they participate more on public matters. That with regard to a growing dissatisfaction with traditional parties in the Czech Republic mainly after 2000 (for reasons of political disillusion and alienation of Czech voters, see for example Linek 2010b), could add rather to the success rate of local entities and to the decrease of an effective index of nationalisation in municipalities with a higher proportion of university educated people. However, our research did not confirm that. The second hypothesis about possible explanations of influence of the higher education variable should take into consideration the fact that the logic of its influence matched only in some cases. And power of the influence of this variable was not very strong (as in the case of majority of other socio-structural variables, which in addition were not mostly statistically significant). These statements then indicate that it is possible also in Czech environment to assume an implementation of the phenomenon of modernization and individualization. These two led in the

developed industrial societies of Western Europe to the fact that the process of individualization reached such an extension that social location of individuals (based in the past on so-called social cleavages (see Lipset – Rokkan 1967)) became fluid, and disrupted an affiliation to the social groups. And therefore it disrupted the possibility to use classical socio-structural factors as determinants of election behaviour. (Thomassen 2005) In the situation of highly individualized voters' behaviour, more than in the past, there could be more significant factors such as for example attitudes of voters to salient issues. (Compare for example Thomassen 2005) Another factor can be the above mentioned political culture of local communities. It can be considerably different among individual municipalities, which are otherwise similar from the position of socio-structural features. However, political culture can have significant influence on the level of local political process.

The analysis of the influence of local political culture on the extent of nationalisation would be at the same time convenient to complete with a view on possible territorial aspects of local party system nationalisation. More precisely, to find whether it is possible to identify from a spatial view for example clustering of municipalities with an extended powers with higher or lower extents of nationalisation in specific regions of the Czech Republic. And therefore whether it is possible to state that extent of nationalisation is somehow geographically dependent. For example Lyons and Linek (2010) identified four local political cultures in the territory of the Czech Republic (on the basis of the analysis of the 2002 parliamentary and the 2004 European elections). And in that respect, it would be definitely beneficial to find out whether this or other similar socio-political classification of the Czech Republic (with regard to a distinctive transformation of the Czech party system in 2010 and 2013) influence also the extent of local party system nationalisation.

In conclusion, we have to state that the hypothesis about the relation between the size of a municipality (in our case municipalities with extended powers, which were a part of our aggregate) and local party system nationalisation was confirmed only in the case of some observed indicators. And also in their case it is necessary to emphasize that an explained variability of regression models was not very high. According to our results, the most promising for the future research is the possibility to work above all with an effective version of the indicators of local party system nationalisation. As for the theme for a further research, it is worth trying an exploration of local party system nationalisation in the previous Czech local elections, when the national system of political parties was showing much higher proportion of stability. This research could thus answer the following question: whether for example generally low proportion of an explained variability of regression models could

not just be caused by distinctive changes that happened in the Czech politics in connection with the parliamentary elections of 2010 and were further deepened in the elections of 2013. Another research could at the same time verify the influence of some variables where we identified an independent influence on local party system nationalisation (competitiveness, higher education). It could also verify suitability of modification of the restriction of national parties which we had to approach. Right in the case of restriction of national parties, this possibility is offered as an alternative solution: use of the research of election preferences. That would enable us to count as national political parties those ones, which in the period closest to the local elections, have the support of 5% of respondents. Alternatively, we could combine this criterion with the condition of a gain of parliamentary representation in the parliamentary elections prior to the local elections. The combination of both criteria (above all taking into consideration presence in the Chamber of Deputies) could thus help at least partially to take into consideration a historical position of a party. Its position could be partly overwhelmed by current mood of voters in sample surveys. However, these surveys themselves definitely do not guarantee the fact that they will totally project themselves into results of elections.

Further possible research should indeed have the ambition to analyse nationalisation (congruence) not only between the national and the local level but also between the regional and the local or between national and regional level of election race<sup>25</sup>. Finally, as the last possibility of further research, it is possible to mention an application of this theoretical concept in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It could bring interesting results in the comparative perspective, even with regard to different types of election systems used in the local elections in individual countries of this area.

*Pavel Maškarinec is assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Philosophy, Philosophical Faculty, Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem. He specializes on electoral geography, spatial analysis of elections, quantitative research of electoral behaviour and electoral systems, and he also studies the ways party systems are shaped by these phenomena, especially in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and Asia.*

---

<sup>25</sup> Whereas in the first Czech regional elections in 2000 non-parliamentary parties gained almost one fifth of votes and a number of their seats only tightly crossed 5% border, in 2012 they already gained more than one third of votes and almost one fifth of seats. (cf. Havlík – Nový 2013: 110-117) The analysis working in different spatial contexts then looks necessary, also with regard to the fact that among individual regions, distinctive differences exist among gains of parliamentary parties; for example in 2012 the parties without parliamentary representation gained from 0.00% seats (Středočeský and Plzeňský region) up to 51.11% seats (Liberecký region). (Havlík – Nový 2013: 112)

## REFERENCES

- ANCKAR, C., 2000: Size and Party System Fragmentation. *Party Politics* 6, č. 3, s. 305-328.
- BALÍK, S., 2008a: Česká komunální politika v obcích s rozšířenou působností. Koalice, voličské vzorce a politické strany na místní úrovni v letech 1994 – 2006. Brno: CDK.
- BALÍK, S., 2008b: Okresy na severu. Komunální politika v okresech Šumperk a Jeseník v letech 1989 – 2006. Brno: CDK.
- BALÍK, S., 2009: Komunální politika. Obce, aktéři a cíle místní politiky. Praha: Grada.
- BLAŽEK, J. – CSANK, P., 2007: Nová fáze regionálního rozvoje v ČR? *Sociologický časopis* 43, č. 1, s. 945-965.
- BOCHSLER, D., 2006: The Nationalization of Political Parties. A triangle model, applied on the Central and Eastern European countries. *CEU Political Science Journal* 1, č. 4, s. 6-37.
- BOCHSLER, D., 2010: Measuring party nationalisation: A new Gini-based indicator that corrects for the number of units. *Electoral Studies* 29, č. 1, s. 155-168.
- BUBENÍČEK, V., 2006: Výzkum komunálních volební kampaní v malých obcích. In: Němec, J. – Šustková, M. (eds.): III. Kongres českých politologů, Olomouc 8.-10. 9. 2006. Praha/Olomouc: ČSPV, s. 741-754.
- CARAMANI, D., 2004: The Nationalization of Politics. The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- CHHIBBER, P. – KOLLMAN, K., 1998: Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in India and the United States. *American Political Science Review* 92, č. 2, s. 329-342.
- CHHIBBER, P. – KOLLMAN, K., 2004: The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- ČMEJREK, J., 2008: Obce a regiony jako politický prostor. Praha: Alfa Nakladatelství.
- CZSO – Public Database (<https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/en/index.jsf>).
- DAHL, R. A. – TUFTE, E. R., 1973: Size and Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- DELTAS, G., 2003: The Small-Sample Bias of the Gini Coefficient: Results and Implications for Empirical Research. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 85, č. 1, s. 226-234.
- DUNLEAVY, P. – BOUCEK, F., 2003: Constructing the Number of Parties. *Party Politics* 9, č. 3, s. 291-315.
- EVANS, J. A. J., 2004: Voters & Voting. An Introduction. London: Sage.
- GIBSON, E. L. – SUAREZ-CAO, J., 2010: Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina. *Comparative Politics* 43, č. 1, s. 21-39.
- GOLOSOV, G. V., 2010: The Effective Number of Parties. A New Approach. *Party Politics* 16, č. 2, s. 171-192.

- HARBERS, I., 2010: Decentralization and the Development of Nationalized Party Systems in New Democracies: Evidence From Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 43, č. 5, s. 606-627.
- HAVLÍK, V. – NOVÝ, M., 2013: Výsledky voleb podle volebních krajů a politických stran. In: Balík, S. a kol.: *Krajské volby 2012*. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, s. 93-122.
- HLOUŠEK, V. – KOPEČEK, L., 2008: Cleavages in the Contemporary Czech and Slovak Politics Between Persistence and Change. *East European Politics & Societies* 22, č. 3, s. 518-552.
- HOSKOVEC, L. – BALÍK, S., 2010: Formáty českých lokálních stranických systémů. *Evropská volební studia* 5, č. 1, s. 28-46.
- HUDÁK, J. – JÜPTNER, P. – SVOBODA, J., 2003, eds.: *Komunální politické systémy*. Praha: FF UK.
- ILLNER, M., 1999: Territorial Decentralization: An Obstacle to Democratic Reform in Central and Eastern Europe? In: Kimball, J. D. (ed.): *The Transfer of Power: Decentralization in Central and Eastern Europe*. Budapest: OSI/LGI, s. 7-42.
- ILLNER, M., 2003: Thirteen years of reforming sub-national government in the Czech Republic. In: Kersting, N. – Vetter, A. (eds.): *Reforming Local Government in Europe: Closing the Gap between Democracy and Efficiency*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, s. 261-281.
- JANČÁK, V. – HAVLÍČEK, T. – CHROMÝ, P. – MARADA, M., 2008: Regional Differentiation of Selected Conditions for the Development of Human and Social Capital in Czechia. *Geografie* 113, č. 3, s. 269-284.
- JONES, M. P. – MAINWARING, S., 2003: The Nationalization of Parties and Party Systems. An Empirical Measure and an Application to the Americas. *Party Politics* 9, č. 2, s. 139-166.
- JÜPTNER, P., 2004: Komunální koalice a politické modely. *Politologická revue* 10, č. 2, s. 80-101.
- JÜPTNER, P., 2008: Local Lists in the Czech Republic. In: Reiser, M. – Holtmann, E. (eds.): *Farewell to the Party Model? Independent Local Lists in East and West European Countries*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, s. 21-37.
- KASUYA, Y. – MOENIUS, J., 2008: The nationalization of party systems: Conceptual issues and alternative district-focused measures. *Electoral Studies* 27, č. 1, s. 126-135.
- KJÆR, U. – ELKLIT, J., 2010: Local Party System Nationalisation: Does Municipal Size Matter? *Local Government Studies* 36, č. 3, s. 425-444.
- KLIMOVSKÝ, D., 2008: Politics and its impact on the reform processes: the case of public administration reform in Slovakia (1989 – 2006). In: Musil, J. (ed.): *Space and Historical Time as Dimensions of Social Change*. Praha: MATFYZPRESS, s. 45-64.
- KOSTELECKÝ, T., 1995: *Rozdíly chování regionálních populací a jejich příčiny*. Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR.
- KOSTELECKÝ, T., 2001: *Vzestup nebo pád politického regionalismu? Změny na politické mapě v letech 1992 až 1998 – srovnání České a Slovenské republiky*. Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR.

- KOSTELECKÝ, T., 2005: Electoral Reforms at the Sub-National Level in the Post-Communist Czech Republic. In: Reynaert, H. – Steyvers, K. – Delwit, P. – Pilet, J.-B. (eds.): *Revolution or Renovation? Reforming Local Politics in Europe*. Brugge: Vanden Broele, s. 103-127.
- KOSTELECKÝ, T. – ČERMÁK, D., 2004: Vliv teritoriálně specifických faktorů na formování politických orientací voličů. *Sociologický časopis* 40, č. 4, s. 469-487.
- KOSTELECKÝ, T. – KRIVÝ, V., 2015: Urbánno-rurálne rozdiely voličského správania v Česku a na Slovensku. *Sociológia* 47, č. 4, s. 390-413.
- KOUBA, K., 2007: Prostorová analýza českého stranického systému. Institucionalizace a prostorové režimy. *Sociologický časopis* 43, č. 5, s. 1017-1037.
- KRUTÍLEK, O., 2003: Celkové výsledky komunálních voleb 2002. In: Balík, S. (ed.): *Komunální volby v České republice v roce 2002*. Brno: MU/MPU, s. 54-74.
- LAAKSO, M. – TAAGEPERA, R., 1979: Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 12, č. 1, s. 3-27.
- LEBEDA, T. – LINEK, L. – LYONS, P. – VLACHOVÁ, K. et al., 2006: *Voliči a volby 2006*. Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR.
- LINEK, L., 2004: Volby do Evropského parlamentu 2004 – analýza volební účasti a stranické podpory v České republice. Praha: Sociologický ústav AV ČR.
- LINEK, L., 2010a, ed.: *Voliči a volby 2010*. Praha: SLON.
- LINEK, L., 2010b: Zrazení snu? Struktura a dynamika postojů k politickému režimu a jeho institucím a jejich důsledky. Praha: SLON.
- LINEK, L. – LYONS, P., 2013: Dočasná stabilita? Volební podpora politických stran v České republice v letech 1990 – 2010. Praha: SLON.
- LIPSET, S. M. – ROKKAN, S., 1967: Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In: Lipset, S. M. – Rokkan, S. (eds.): *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: The Free Press, s. 1-64.
- LYONS, P. – LINEK, L., 2010: Party System Nationalisation and Non-uniform Vote Switching. Evidence from the Czech Republic. *Sociologický časopis* 46, č. 3, s. 375-399.
- MAŠKARINEC, P., 2013: Prostorová analýza prezidentských voleb v České republice v roce 2013. *Sociológia* 45, č. 5, s. 435-469.
- MAŠKARINEC, P. – BLÁHA, P., 2014: For whom the Bell Tolls: Grievance Theory and the Rise of New Political Parties in the 2010 and 2013 Czech Parliamentary Elections. *Sociológia* 46, č. 6, s. 706-731.
- MIHÁLIK, J. – KLIMOVSKÝ, D., 2014: Decentralization of educational system and its impact on local self-government in Slovakia. *Lex Localis: Journal of Local Self-Government* 12, č. 3, s. 467-480.
- MOLINAR, J., 1991: Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index. *American Political Science Review* 85, č. 4, s. 1383-1391.
- NEWTON, K., 1982: Is Small Really so Beautiful? Is Big Really so Ugly? Size, Effectiveness, and Democracy in Local Government. *Political Studies* 30, č. 2, s. 190-206.
- NOVOTNÝ, L. – TACHECÍ, P., 2013: Komunální volby v Ústí nad Labem. Ústí nad Labem: FF UJEP.

- PILEČEK, J. – JANČÁK, V., 2010: Je možné měřit sociální kapitál? Analýza územní diferenciacie okresů Česka. *Geografie* 115, č. 1, s. 78-95.
- PLECITÁ-VLACHOVÁ, K., 2001: Voličské profily relevantních stran na příkladu konkrétní lokality (město Klatovy). In: Mrklas, L. (ed.): *Krajské volby 2000. Fakta, názory, komentáře*. Praha: CEVRO, s. 87-95.
- RYŠAVÝ, D., 2006: Komunální je komunální a velká je velká! K hypotéze politizace lokálních politických elit. *Sociologický časopis* 42, č. 5, s. 953-970.
- RYŠAVÝ, D. – ŠARADÍN, P., 2011: *Zastupitelé českých měst a obcí v evropské perspektivě*. Praha: SLON.
- SCHAKEL, A. H., 2013: Nationalisation of multilevel party systems: A conceptual and empirical analysis. *European Journal of Political Research* 52, č. 2, s. 212-236.
- SIKK, A., 2005: How unstable? Volatility and the genuinely new parties in Eastern Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* 44, č. 3, s. 391-412.
- STOKES, D., 1967: Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces. In: Chambers, W. N. – Burnham W. D. (eds.): *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*. New York: Oxford University Press, s. 182-202.
- SLDB, 2011: *Population and Housing Census 2011*. Prague: Czech Statistical Office.
- SMITH, M. L. – MATĚJŮ, P., 2011: Restratifikace české politiky. Vývoj třídně podmíněného volebního chování v České republice v letech 1992 – 2010. *Sociologický časopis* 47, č. 1, s. 33-59.
- STEGMAIER, M. – VLACHOVÁ, K., 2011: The parliamentary election in the Czech Republic, May 2010. *Electoral Studies* 30, č. 1, s. 238-241.
- STEGMAIER, M. – LINEK, L., 2014: The parliamentary election in the Czech Republic, October 2013. *Electoral Studies* 35, s. 385-388.
- STRMISKA, M. – CHYTILEK, R. – ŠEDO, J. – EIBL, O., 2009: *Volební komplex země V4. Studie k pojetí víceúrovňového volebního prostoru*. Brno: CDK.
- ŠARADÍN, P., 2003: Volební analýza krajských měst. *Acta Universitatis Palackianae Olomucensis, Politologica* 2, s. 45-58.
- ŠARADÍN, P., 2004a: Neparlamentní subjekty ve volbách do obecních zastupitelstev. *Politologický časopis* 11, č. 1, s. 109-120.
- ŠARADÍN, P., 2004b: Volební účast ve volbách do obecních zastupitelstev v ČR. *Středoevropské politické studie* 4, č. 2-3.
- THOMASSEN, J., 2005: Introduction. In: Thomassen, J. (ed.): *The European Voter. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, s. 1-21.
- THORLAKSON, L., 2006: Party systems in multi-level contexts. In: Hough, D. – Jeffery, C. (eds.): *Devolution and Electoral Politics*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, s. 37-52.