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ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN POLAND AS THE EFFECT OF THE “CLASH OF CIVILIZATION”

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The paper addresses the problem of cultural differentiation within Poland as the main factor behind the spatial differentiation of the voting behaviour of Poles. The existing differences in terms of culture are considered to be the effect of the complex history of the Polish territories, and particularly of the last 250 years. Thus, the paper concentrates on the analysis of historical conditioning and the way in which it gets reflected through the contemporary political attitudes of the inhabitants of Poland. Reference is made in the paper to the theories and propositions of two well known scholars dealing with the differentiation of humanity with respect to civilizations – Feliks Koneczny and Samuel P. Huntington.

Key words: elections, cultural differentiation, Poland

INTRODUCTION

The specific features of the Polish political life caused that during the 1990s four main political options took shape. The two primary antagonistic political options are referred to in the report as the *right* and the *left*. The conflict between them has first of all an ideological character. The two remaining options, strongly antagonistic, as well, are the *liberals* and the *peasant party*. Here, the conflict is to a larger extent based on the socio-economic prerequisites. The

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rightist and the liberal forces originate mainly from the opposition movement of the 1980s. In contrast, the leftist and the peasant parties are to a large extent based upon the groups associated with the former communist power system. These associations seem to explain sufficiently the composition of the consecutive ruling coalitions. They were, namely, either rightist-liberal or leftist-peasant. If we simplify further, therefore, we could divide the Polish political landscape into just two main camps.

From the very first free elections in 1989, one could observe the spatial differentiation of support for the particular political options, which became characteristic for the later period. This differentiation refers very clearly to the historical boundaries, which divided up Poland in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, to the distribution of the regional ethnic groups (Kashubians, Silesians, Mountain-eers), the historical social groups (Masovian small nobility), religious minorities (Orthodox Christians and Protestants), as well as national minorities (Lithuanians, Germans, Lemkos, Ukrainians, Belarusians), and the general opposition between the town and the countryside (Fig. 1, 2 and 3).




Fig. 1. Historical and cultural background of the contemporary political life in Poland
A – western border of the settlement continuity after World War II. B – state borders since World War I.

The parties and candidates belonging to the rightist option have attained the highest support in the area of former Galicia (southern Poland, belonging in the

19th century to Austria), in the areas inhabited by the Catholic regional groups, as well as around large urban centres. The liberal option has been getting the strongest support first of all in the urban agglomerations. It was also relatively more popular in the western, more urbanized part of the country. The support for the leftist option has been the strongest in the area of the north-western Poland, as well as in some parts of the former Polish Kingdom (a purely administrative entity existing in the 19th century under the czarist rule). Especially strong support has been observed in the areas inhabited by the religious and ethnic minorities. An exception is here constituted by the population declaring German nationality, who form their own political representation, and in case of direct confrontation between the left and the right, they opt mainly for the latter. The peasant party gained the strongest support in the area that belonged to the Russian Empire in the 19th century.




Fig. 2. Presidential election 1995 in Poland. Summary result of the left candidates (round I)

A – western border of the settlement continuity after World War II. B – state borders since World War I.

Similar regularities can be identified in the spatial differentiation of the electoral turnout. The highest voting frequencies are usually observed on the areas which belonged in the past to the Prussian and Austrian states, as well as in the urban agglomerations. The lowest indicators of participation in the elections

have been observed in the area of the former Polish Kingdom, and in the Western Lands, regained after the Second World War from Germany, following several centuries of German rule there, and first of all in the countryside (Fig. 4).

In the opinion of S. Rokkan, the modern political parties reflect the conflicts of the past. Conflicts lead to break-ups, which, in turn, find their reflection in the political parties. Again, according to Rokkan, the revolution of nationalism in the European history brought the breakdown of cultures into the subordinated and dominated ones, as well as the separation between the church and the state, while the industrial revolution brought the break-up between the primary and secondary sectors of the economy, as well as between the employers and employees. The majority of the European political parties can be characterised with respect to these four dichotomies (Rokkan 1970).




Fig. 3. Presidential election 2000 in Poland. Summary result of the left-of-centre candidates (round I)

A – western border of the settlement continuity after World War II. B – state borders since World War I.

T. Zarycki (1997) notices that such a scheme of political divisions, classical for the Western Europe, can for many reasons hardly be applied to the situation observed in Poland. In his opinion “it is most difficult to analyse the ideological dimension of the spatial divisions, that is – [according to] the axis referred to (...) as right-left. This division overlaps with a significant number of historical

differentiations, which form a very ambiguous structure from the normative point of view". This indeed is in line with the observation of Grabowska et al. (1996), who propose that the transition from the totalitarian to the democratic system, taking place in Poland since 1989, is a change of a comparable scale than that which took place during the 19th century. The situation is entirely new and has not been vested with an appropriate theory of transition, describing it.




Fig. 4. Voting turnout in the parliamentary elections 1997

A – western border of the settlement continuity after World War II. B – state borders since World War I.

The differentiation of the electoral behaviour of the inhabitants of present-day Poland is attributed by many authors first of all to the differences in the historical conditioning, shaping the communities of the particular regions. The significance of the broadly conceived cultural differentiation is mainly emphasized. One cannot overlook the fact, though, that this cultural differentiation is related to the socio-economic conditioning. The biggest disproportions seem to exist between the area of the former Galicia and the Western Lands (Zarycki 1998).

The comparison of the socio-economic reality of Galicia (and in particular the mountain areas) and the Western Lands (especially the Western Pomerania) makes apparent the enormous differences in the way the respective societies are

organized. In the two regions the different cultural, social, economic, and political settings are correlated among themselves, forming two quite separate, and in the extreme cases – mutually exclusive – systems¹.

A strong attachment to traditional values, as an important element shaping public life, persisted in former Galicia. This area has not been subject to the same dramatic historical shocks, and especially the mass movements of population, as some other parts of the country. The socio-economic transformations had a more evolutionary character here, the respect for private property, and the strong family and community ties have been preserved. One should not overlook, the fact that this area belonged in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century to the Habsburg Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, ensuring quite an important set of freedoms and citizen rights, as well as a relatively high level of education. All these conditions put together may be seen as the reasons for the later distance with respect to the system introduced by the communists.

A new society, on the other hand, was formed after the Second World War in the area of the Western Lands. The settlers, coming from various directions (Kosiński 1960), had to adapt themselves to a large extent to the economic and settlement infrastructure inherited from the Prussian (German) society, which made an impact on the organization of their life. At the same time, they preserved some of the features characteristic of their societies of origin – mainly the “eastern” ones, which had been part of the Russian Empire (Polish Kingdom, the Lithuanian and Belarusian territories, Volhynia). The mixing of the population, resulting from the migrations, made it difficult to achieve the integration, characteristic for the traditional society, especially insofar as the society was taking shape in the new territory in the period of introduction of the socialist system. The domination of the settlers coming from the areas associated in the past with Russia, who were, in addition, selected through migration, having weaker ties to the civil traditions, but, instead, subject to a strong pressure from definite modernization transformations (industrialization, hired labour in farming, decrease of religious practices, break-up of the traditional community), was advantageous for their adaptation to the infrastructure encountered in the Western Lands and to the socio-economic system, enforced by the new authorities, strongly associated with this infrastructure (large-scale farming enterprises).

In direct relation to the situation observed and in reference to Rokkan’s theory of the cultural foundations of political conflicts, T. Zarycki proposes that the historical conditioning of the development of Polish society led to the formation of two varieties of national culture in Poland, of which it is hard to say, which one is subordinated, and which one – dominating. These cultures are fighting for domination in Polish society and possess differentiated degrees of influence in particular historical regions. This cultural differentiation would be decisive for the spatial intensity of sympathies for the two essential political

¹ This perception of the close association of particular fragments of regional reality finds its confirmation in the views of W. Tatarkiewicz. According to this author, there is a constant exchange going on between culture, understood as the sphere of subjective emotions of men and the socially accepted norms, values, and ideals, on the one hand, and the external world, created by people in an artificial manner, on the other hand. That is, under the influence of the internal experiences and spiritual inspirations human beings enrich and transform the external world, which, in turn, influences human sensations and shapes attitudes (Tatarkiewicz 1978, after Polak 1999).

forces – left and right (Zarycki 1997). Knowledge of the complex political history of Poland gives rise to the question whether we are not dealing with differentiation between different civilization.

The inspiration for the hypothesis that the political differentiation of the societies of Central and Eastern Europe may have resulted from the differentiation of civilizations has perhaps come from the considerations of S. P. Huntington (1998) contained in the book "*Clash of Civilisations*". Huntington forwards the hypothesis that the political divisions in the contemporary world are increasingly strongly associated with the differences between civilizations, given the assumption that the notion of "civilization" denotes the "broadest platform of cultural identity", defined by the objectively common elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, and social institutions, as well as the subjective self-identification of people (Huntington 1998, pp. 45-46). According to him, the primary divide of civilizations cuts Europe into the western part dominated by Western Christianity and the eastern part dominated by Orthodox Christianity. He also observes the differences existing between the Catholic South and the Protestant North of Western Europe, these differences potentially treated as an internal division within Western civilisation.

S. P. Huntington provides the instance of Ukraine as the example for the correctness of the concept of "clash of civilizations". In his opinion, the clash of the Orthodox (Russian) civilization with the Western one is taking place there. On the one hand the Orthodox and Russified East, with the region of Donbas as the centre of this phenomenon, and on the other hand the Catholic and national West with the centre in the former province of Galicia. This polarization of civilizations finds its reflection in political life. On the one hand – the pro-Russian communists, and on the other hand – the pro-Western nationalists (Huntington 1998). This division is easily apparent during all the elections taking place in Ukraine since 1990.

When trying to find the justification for this differentiation, Huntington emphasizes the separate nature of the historical traditions of the two parts of the country, despite the fact that both are inhabited by the people declaring themselves to be Ukrainians. Huntington concentrates on the religious differences, treating them as the primary axis of the civilisations' divide. He sees Catholics on the one side, and the Sovietized population of Orthodox origin on the other side. It must be noted, though, that those Orthodox regions, which were associated for a much shorter time period with Russia (Northern Bukovina) or with the USSR (Volhynia), do not differ in a particular manner in their electoral behaviour from the Catholic regions. This fact gives rise to the supposition that not only the religious tradition, but also the tradition of statehood constitutes a very important element in the differentiation of the societies. F. Koneczny considers that it is not religion, but the way, in which social life is organized, that constitutes the most important element differentiating the civilization systems. Religion is one of many factors, very important, but certainly not the sole element.

The problem of the "clash of civilizations" as the moving force of the political conflicts is not a new invention. Similar conclusions have been reached by the already mentioned historian Koneczny (1935, 1973, 1997a, 1997b), a Polish scholar active in the first half of the 20th century. In his opinion, Latin civiliza-

tion was characteristic for the civilization of Western Europe. This particular civilization took shape on the ruins of the Western Roman Empire. Its main competitor on the European continent was allegedly the Byzantine civilization, which developed in the area of the Eastern Roman Empire. Side by side with these two civilizations, he also noticed the influence of what he called the Turanian civilization, characteristic for the Asian nomadic peoples. Koneczny proposed that the civilization system of Russia was shaped exactly by the mix of the Byzantine and Turanian civilizations. In the eyes of many scholars communist Russia continued this tradition and, in fact, it was this particular tradition that made possible the formation of the communist system (Rościszewski 1997, Kucharzewski 1998). F. Koneczny noticed also the civilization-bound significance of Protestantism. In his opinion the Reformation brought a weakening of the foundations of the Latin civilization, providing the easy ground for what he called "northern Byzantinism". According to this author, although the latter formation has not got the upper hand in all the Protestant countries, it achieved the form that was the closest to the Byzantine original in Protestant Prussia (Koneczny 1973). There are definite opinions that these traditions were a good breeding ground for the development of National Socialism in Germany, and then communism in the German Democratic Republic (Salmonowicz 1987, Ash 1989, Piskozub 1995), and were also conducive for the development of the system promoted by the social-democrats (Salmonowicz 1987).

INTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION OF POLAND IN TERMS OF CIVILIZATIONS

Poland became a part of Western civilization only at the turn of the 11th century. Until then it had rather been a part of something that could be called Slavic culture. The subsequent influences of the West have not been distributed evenly throughout Polish society. They were definitely the strongest among the nobles and the townspeople, who constituted altogether roughly 30 % of the society, and weaker among the peasants (the remaining approximately 70 % of Polish society). Besides, Polish society has been subject to strong pressure from the eastern civilizations. Many scholars indicate that this was already the case before the 18th century partitions of Poland, due to which the major part of Poland fell to Russia. The eastern influences were due to the union with the Lithuanian-Ruthenian statehood, and to the frequent contacts with other eastern societies (Koneczny 1997b). In view of geographical location these influences affected primarily the eastern areas of the then Polish territory. After the third partition, which took in 1795, and especially after 1815 (the Congress of Vienna), the major part of the former Commonwealth, and of the ethnically Polish areas (the so-called "Congress Kingdom", or Polish Kingdom), were incorporated in the Russian Empire. The remaining parts of Poland were associated with the Austrian and Prussian states (Fig. 1). (We will be referring in the further course of the paper to these areas as to the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian part, respectively.) It can be assumed, after Hryniwicz (1996), that the fact of belonging to the individual partitioning powers strengthened the previous civilization-related influences. The West of the country (the Austrian and the Prussian parts) was becoming even more Western, while the East (the Russian part) – even more Eastern. This situation lasted until the First World War, due to which almost all the

ethnically Polish lands were included in the re-established sovereign Poland. Since that time the issue of the differences existing between the lands which had belonged to the particular partitioning countries became a serious problem for the re-established Polish state. Eastern Poland, the “post-Russian” area (the former “Congress Kingdom”, and the eastern fringe) stood apart from the rest of country in view of, for instance, a high level of illiteracy, lack of civil traditions, and a poor transport network. The differences were also reflected in the political life. Thus, against the background of the remaining Polish lands the former Russian part was much more leftist (Fig. 5), which was expressed through a stronger support for such parties as the Polish Peasant Party “Liberation”, Polish Socialist Party, and Communist Party of Poland, than was observed elsewhere. A difference in the attitudes with respect to the public affairs can also be seen through the reaction to the May coup of 1926. While the societies of the former Austrian and Prussian parts definitely supported the legal administration, the society of the former Russian part supported the coup and its participants more strongly (Ajnenkiel 1986).

There is ample evidence indicating that the differences between the former Russian part and the other parts of pre-war Poland persist until today. The area of the Congress Kingdom still has the lowest educational level (Gałczyńska 1998), a low level of political involvement (low turnouts in elections), low level of religious practices (Kłoczowski and Müllerowa 1992), the least developed technical infrastructure network, and is taking the lowest positions in the rankings of economic development and entrepreneurship (see Gorzelak and Jałowiecki 1998). It should also be added that it is in the area of the former Congress Kingdom that the most advanced depopulation processes can be observed (Eberhardt 1986), to a large extent resembling the processes taking place in the area of contemporary Russia.

The differences also concern the political sympathies. The former Russian part is the area, in which during the 1990s the strongest support was noted for the Polish Peasant Party, a party, which in terms of its economic program is definitely leftist, and represents the interests of the most backward rural communities. (...) In many regions this is yet amplified by the support given the post-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, considered to be the main party of the contemporary Polish left. This concerned first of all the peripherally located traditional clusters of the urban proletariat (Dąbrowa Coal Basin, Włocławek, Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski), as well as the rural proletariat (e.g. southern part of the Kielce region, Cuiavia, western Masovia). Very good results were obtained in the same areas in the presidential elections by Tymiński (1990), and Kwaśniewski (1995 and 2000). On the other hand, in comparison with the areas which belonged until the First World War to Prussia or Austria, the influence of the liberal option (Union of Freedom, Union of Real Politics), and of the rightist one (Electoral Action of Solidarity, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland) were relatively weak in the area of the former Russian part. The first of these two options would win good electoral results only in the areas of the urban agglomerations (Warsaw, Łódź, Lublin, Białystok). The latter option would get relatively good results within the same agglomerations and among the communities with the small-nobility traditions in Masovia and Podlasie. In the opinion of T. Zarycki this pattern of spatial differentiation of electoral behaviour re-

sembles in many respects the present-day political reality of Russia. In both cases the liberal urban centres can be observed as islands against the background of the homogeneous anti-liberal province (Zarycki 1999).

The phenomena mentioned, and their similarity to the ones existing in Russia, give rise to the supposition of a certain civilization-related connection between the eastern part of Poland and Russia. According to Hrynewicz (1996) the western boundary of the “Congress” Polish Kingdom has for a long time been the limit of the territories subject to the influence of civilization from Russia. This particular scholar notices also that the economic culture, characteristic for the civilization in question, “features a relatively low significance attached to individual activity, an important role of the state, and the centrally co-ordinated political-and-cultural unity, consisting in a strong collaboration of the religious and administrative institutions. (...) A singularity of this kind of society against the background of the European societies is constituted by the relatively low significance of social hierarchy and a kind of equality in subordination.”

A potential rejection of the hypothesis of a strong impact of the Russian civilization on the society of the Russian part of former Poland does not exclude a difference between the latter and the societies of the remaining parts of Poland. It could have a connection with the original civilization of the Polish people, whose roots could be traced, perhaps, back to the pre-Christian period. A number of scholars, who noted the delay in the assumption of the national features and consciousness by the folk strata of the society, emphasized at the same time, that these groups had their own civilization and the corresponding culture, which could not be compared to any type of the higher formations in the society (see Zdybel 1998, Chałasiński 1938, Znaniecki 1990). It can be supposed that in view of the difficulties in the development of the national life in the area of the part of Poland incorporated into Russia in the 19th century, this specific form of civilization persisted there in the highest degree. Hence, Russia would in such a situation play a sort of indirect role, not so much enforcing its own civilization as making it difficult for the lower classes of the Russian part of Poland to participate in the realm of norms characteristic for the Western civilization. We cannot, of course, exclude the joint influence of the two factors, the native folk civilization and the Russian civilization, both contributing to the weakening the impact from the Western civilization, and thereby to an extent making similar the two Slavic societies – Polish and Russian. These circumstances make some scholars, especially the Russian ones, consider Poles and Russians, along with other Slavic nations (oftentimes with exception of the Czechs and Slovenians) to be the representatives of a Slavic civilization, opposed to the West. Taking into account the observations presented, we could admit that this applies to a large extent to a part of Polish society.

The similarities in terms of civilization, resulting from the connections existing in a more distant past, could have been strengthened by the imposition of the socialist system in Poland, this system having been modelled after the Russian (Soviet) patterns, and, in the opinion of numerous scholars, mentioned before, having resulted from the specific nature of the Russian civilization, being yet another form of it. Thus, according to Huntington (1998) the ideology produced in the West was used in the establishment of a political and economic

system, which would not have come into existence in the West. It can be supposed that the societies that had been subject to the influence of the civilization of the East, were more susceptible to the impact of the new system. At this point the problem of the Western Lands comes into the picture, where the socialist socio-economic system was rooted most deeply.




Fig. 5. Summary result of the right-of-centre parties in the parliamentary elections 1922
A – state borders since World War I

The above analysis of the separate civilization-related character of the former Russian part of Poland against the background of the other parts seems to be especially important for the study of the electoral behaviour of the population inhabiting the Western Lands. This is due to the fact that the society of the present western voivodships of Poland took shape on the foundation of settlers, who came in their vast majority from the territories that belonged to Russia in the 19th century. Therefrom, we can suppose that the civilization model characteristic for the eastern, post-Russian Poland, was simply transferred to the West. This post-war “orientalization” of the Western Lands in terms of civilization is noticed, in particular, by Rykiel (1997). One should also remember that a new systemic element was added in this settlement region, linked with the development of the “socialized” agriculture. Introduction of this type of economy was to a large extent made easy by the existing settlement and economic infrastructure, a product of the Prussian society (Szulc 1988). As far as the spread of this

economic system is concerned, the Western Lands, and first of all the Western Pomerania took the leading positions among all the Polish historical regions. In the opinion of Nowakowski (1967) it was exactly in the Western Lands that the transformations promoted by the communist authorities, and the subsequent formation of a new kind of Polish society, rejecting the traditional cultural values, took a more rapid and deeper course than in the remaining areas of Poland. Admitting that the socio-economic system in question was based upon the Russian models, we can forward the proposition that – from the perspective of the end of the 20th century – the new communities of the Western Lands were to the largest extent influenced by the eastern civilization. First of all because of their origins, and then – in view of the circumstances shaping their lives in their new places of residence. An important role in the process could also be played by the uprooting of the settlers from their traditional environments, and the mixing that took place in the new locations of residence. We can suppose that the phenomena, resulting from it, belonging to the realm of culture (the settlers gave up a part of their separate identity to the advantage of a more universal culture in order to have an easier contact with the neighbours), were conducive to the socio-cultural integration involving a broader use of the cultural patterns established by the socialist system². These latter circumstances omitted, on the other hand, the Congress Kingdom (and Galicia), where collectivization was significantly slowed down after the changes of the year 1956, and the dramatic mixing of the population concerned only the dynamically developing industrial centres. This could be an indication that the civilization-wise East of Poland not only spread into the western provinces of the country, but that its new centre actually took shape in the West of Poland (Fig. 1). The similarity between the societies of the Western Lands and the former Russian part of Poland is well demonstrated by such phenomena as low educational level, low intensity of participation in religious activities, weak political involvement of the inhabitants, and their leftist sympathies.

The new civilization qualities, which were shaped in the Western Lands, were included in the same state organism as the communities, which had been more strongly associated with the West already before the partitions of Poland, avoided until 1945 the associations with Russia, and during the time of the partitions were parts of state organisms, which, despite many shortcomings, guaranteed the set of norms characteristic for the civil state and the rule of law, much broader than that offered in Russia, and were not subject to such a total impact of the socialist system after the Second World War (Fig. 1). Private property was preserved in these areas to a much greater extent, the traditional cultural ties persisted, along with the attachment to Western Christianity. The society living in these areas is also characterized by a higher educational level and a deeper political involvement. This society also appears to be better adapted to the principles proper for the market economy and, more generally, for the direction of transformations started in 1989.

² According to M. Novak (1985, p. 308, after B. Synak 1998): "If people are deprived of their emotional ties with the family, culture, and the system of values, they can be reconstructed from scratch. As long as they do not have a clear view of the world and are devoid of identity, they can be manipulated more freely and told what they should be like".

When analysing the civilization-related specificity of the Western Lands, we should not forget, of course, that a part of the settlers came from the former Prussian part of Poland. In addition, all the new inhabitants of the Western Lands had to adapt themselves to the settlement and economic infrastructure produced by the Prussian society. This infrastructure became an important factor in the introduction of the socialist system, not just on the Western Lands, but also on some areas of the former Prussian part. Opinions can also be encountered that it is exactly the settlers from the former Prussian part, who despite their relatively small number, played an important role in the adaptation of all the settlers to the new local conditions (Burszta 1967). With all this taken into account we should also remember that in a large portion of the area of the Prussian part, first of all in the region of Poznań, socio-economic conditions had taken shape resembling those existing in the Western Lands. The transformations, associated with the so-called “Prussian road to capitalism”, ended with a serious restructuring of agriculture. Large-scale landed property developed at the expense of the small farms. Poorer farmers were pushed into the position of the rural proletariat. The disintegration of the traditional social system was taking place, linked, in particular, with an almost complete disappearance of the regional folk culture (Bencz 1996). This was amplified by the cultural influence of the Prussian society, strengthened additionally by the policy of the state (“Kulturkampf” – “cultural struggle”). A deep imprint was also left on the society of the region of Poznań, much deeper than on the societies of other regions of Poland, by the Nazi occupation of the years 1939-1945. We can suppose that the society of the historical region of Greater Poland, where the area surrounding Poznań belongs, deprived of the protection provided by the traditional regional culture to a larger extent than the inhabitants of other regions not associated with Russia, were effectively influenced by the Prussian system, and then by the imposed Polish socialist system³.

The Prussian civilization system was called by Koneczny (1973) the “northern Byzantinism” and was treated by him as the most perfect form of the Byzantine civilization. This system was, of course, closer to the European one than the Russian (see Piskozub 1995), but was otherwise in many respects significantly divergent from the canons of the European civilization. The socio-political system developed in the Prussian state was very often referred to as the Prussian state socialism. One of its traditional principles was “the exercise of authority over the society from the position of a father taking care of his children” (Davies 1991). The characteristic features, associated with social life in this particular state, were feeling of duty with respect to the state, the care for the order, the feeling of the common good, thinking in the categories of community, and not the individual (Salmonowicz 1987). Opinions are numerous, according to which it is on the basis of the Prussian traditions that the national-socialist system emerged (see Salmonowicz 1987), and then also the system of the German Democratic Republic (see Ash 1989). The beginnings of the socialist state-oriented modernization of Western Poland, characteristic of the post-war period, can certainly be seen already in the Prussian period. These conditions, facilitating formation of the socialist socio-economic system in the West-

³ See footnote 5.

ern Lands, most probably exerted a similar influence in Greater Poland. The events of the 20th century were indeed conducive to such developments. Due to the two world wars Greater Poland was the region of the “ancient” Poland, which underwent the deepest demographic revolution (losses of Polish population, outflow of the German population, interregional migrations). The land reform had the biggest impact here, and the system of the “socialized” economy in agriculture was most extensive. The effects of these processes are well seen through many indicators (low social mobility, share of private property in agriculture and estate), which display a greater similarity with those for the Western Lands than with the remaining regions of “ancient” Poland (see Kowalski 2000). The earlier impact of the “northern Byzantinism” and the later expansion of the socialist system, which took advantage of the previous conditioning, having left a deep imprint on the socio-economic life of the region, may constitute the prerequisite for the proposition that a large portion of the former Prussian part of Poland – and first of all the Greater Poland – underwent the process of the “orientalization” of its civilisation, becoming similar in this respect to the Western Lands.

Summing up this part of the considerations we can hypothesize that the influence of the two “Byzantinisms” – Russian and the Prussian, played a very important role in the formation of the socialist system in Poland, with the societies of the former Russian and Prussian parts of Poland turning out to be the most susceptible to this influence, and to the socialist type of transformation⁴. It is important for our considerations here to note that, on the other hand, this type of process affected the remaining Polish lands only to a limited degree.

It cannot be denied, of course, that the processes of modernization have been taking place in the area of western Poland, first owing to the Prussian state socialism, and then also to socialist Poland. It seems that especially in the rural areas these processes were much more intensive than in the countryside of eastern Poland. This might, therefore, be the foundation for the hypothesis that western Poland got closer in terms of civilization to Europe. Such a hypothesis appears to be probable in relation to the German understanding of the notion of civilization, where primarily the level of the scientific and technological development is accounted for. Thus, in terms of technical infrastructure the western part of Poland was definitely ahead of the eastern part. S. P. Huntington proposes, though, not to identify modernization with “Westernization”. In his opinion, the West was “Western” even before the start of the proper processes of its modernization (around the year 1500). On the other hand the scientific progress (modernization) in the societies belonging to different civilizations does not lead to the disappearance of the separate character of their civilizations. The reforms introduced in Russia by Peter I the Great only made the rule of despotism

⁴ The significance of the Russian as well as Prussian traditions in formation of the socialist system, and the systemic similarity of these two traditions can be illustrated by the reactions of the societies of the former German Democratic Republic and Russia to the disintegration of the socialist system. In both cases distinct difficulties appeared in the adaptation to the new conditions. Even German scholars are inclined to admit that Poles display more initiative than their East German neighbours (Baring 2000). The problem of the adaptation of Russian society is even more obvious. In both cases the lack of individualism and the attachment to the collective manner of managing the economy, along with the tradition of strong intervention of the state into the socio-economic life are emphasized.

in his country more efficient (Huntington 1998). The same can most probably be said of the socialist modernization in the countries of Eastern Europe. It was based upon the methods characteristic for the civilization of the East, and thus actually broadened the reach of influence of this civilization. It can be supposed that the traditions of the Western civilization system had greater chances of survival within those regional societies, which did not belong to the Russian part in the 19th century, and then were not subject to the intensive processes of socialist modernization.

CONCLUSION

T. Zarycki forwarded the hypothesis presented at the beginning of this paper, namely that the historical conditioning of the development of Polish society brought the formation of two varieties of Polish national culture. In continuation of these considerations we could suggest the hypothesis that in one case we would deal with a culture shaped with a more important contribution of the elements of Western civilization (individualism, private property, civil traditions, evolutionary development, separation of the church and the state), while in the second case – with a culture having taken shape with a greater contribution from the elements of the Eastern civilization (collectivism, public or “socialized” sector, authoritarian traditions, revolutionary development, subordination of the church to the state or limitation of the influence of the church). The “Western” variety of Polish culture gained the biggest influence in the former Austrian part of Poland (Galicia), as well as in some regions which belonged to Prussia in the 19th century (Upper Silesia, Gdańsk Pomerania), that is – on these areas, where the historical processes were most advantageous for the development of the Western civilization. The “Eastern” variety of the Polish culture got the strongest influence, on the other hand, in the former Russian part, in a large fragment of the Prussian part (the region of Poznań), and in the Western Lands, namely – on the areas, on which the historical processes were more advantageous for the development of the “Eastern” civilization. In both cases we can definitely speak of several regional variants (Fig. 1). This differentiation in terms of civilizations would also influence the evaluation of the systemic transformation processes taking place since 1989. The societies more strongly associated with the Eastern civilization (like Western Pomerania) seem to be worse prepared for these transformations, despite the good indicators of socio-economic development, which, in turn, brings a more distinct longing for the previous system. The societies, which are more strongly attached to the Western civilization, despite the apparent cultural traditionalism (and perhaps precisely owing to it), and the often even lower (although growing) development indicators, seem to be more satisfied with the new situation.

The differentiation of the influence exerted by the civilization-related qualities ought to be also perceived, following the proposition of S. P. Huntington (1998) formulated for Ukraine, as the sources of the regional differentiation of the political sympathies. The stronger “Eastern” influence and the worse preparedness for the return to the norms characteristic for the Western civilisation, resulting from it, would be advantageous for the Polish left, identified with the socialist model, based on the “Eastern” patterns. The stronger “Western” influ-

ences would, then, be advantageous for the Polish right, identified with the struggle for the return of the norms characteristic for the Western civilization. The liberal and the peasant options would also fit into the scheme presented. The first of them would be characteristic for the elitist and strongly secularized, usually urban, communities, who are, however, rooted in the Western traditions. The second of these options would be characteristic for the traditional rural communities, whose connections with the West are the weakest.⁵

A comparison of the results of elections from the beginning (1922) and the end (1997) of the last century, and the similarities, which can be observed through such a comparison, seem to confirm the conviction that the differentiation of the electoral behaviour of the inhabitants of Poland is by no means due to the passing fashions or to temporary opportunities. A strong correlation with the course of the boundaries of the partitions and with the different historical experiences of the particular communities seem to indicate that the hypothesis proposing that this is the effect of influence from the different civilization systems might indeed be true.

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⁵ The particularly strong links with the East, and therefore the strong influence of the left, would exist first of all in the West of Poland. The influence of the peasant option would be characteristic for these communities, which were subject to the strong Eastern influence only in the period preceding the socialist modernization. It is perhaps precisely because of this that the influence of the right on the area of the former Congress Kingdom is much stronger than in the Greater Poland, or in the Western Lands. This is true first of all for the areas surrounding the large regional centres of the Congress Kingdom (Warsaw, Łódź, Lublin, Radom, Kielce), being the traditional centres of the national culture, more strongly attached to the civilisation of the West. The weakness of the socialist modernisation was most probably conducive to the impact of the civil traditions of the large centres on the traditional peasant communities living in their zone of influence.

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VOLEBNÉ SPRÁVANIE V POĽSKU AKO ÚČINOK CIVILIZAČNÉHO STRETU

T. Zarycki predložil hypotézu uvedenú na začiatku tohto príspevku, že historické podmienky vývoja poľskej spoločnosti priniesli vytvorenie dvoch druhov poľskej národnej kultúry. Ak pokračujeme v týchto úvahách, mohli by sme sa pokúsiť o hypotézu, že v jednom prípade máme do činenia s kultúrou formovanou za významného prispenia prvkov západnej civilizácie (individualizmus, súkromné vlastníctvo, občianske tradície, evolučný typ vývoja, cirkev oddelená od štátu), kým v tom druhom sa kultúra formovala za hrajnej účasti prvkov východnej civilizácie (kolektivizmus, verejný alebo socializovaný sektor, autoritárskie tradície, revolučný typ vývoja, podriadenie cirkvi štátu alebo obmedzenie vplyvu cirkvi). „Západný typ“ poľskej kultúry získal najväčší vplyv v bývalej rakúskej časti Poľska (Halič), ako aj v niektorých regiónoch, ktoré patrili v 19. storočí Prusku (Horné Sliezsko, Gdansk, Pomoransko), teda v tých oblastiach, kde boli historické procesy najvýhodnejšie pre vývoj západnej civilizácie. „Východný“

druh poľskej kultúry nadobudol najsilnejší vplyv v bývalej ruskej časti, na veľkej ploche Pruskej časti (región Poznane) a na západe krajiny, najmä v oblastiach, kde boli historické procesy výhodnejšie pre vývoj „východnej“ civilizácie. V oboch prípadoch môžeme s určitosťou hovoriť o niekoľkých regionálnych variantoch (obr. 1). Táto diferenciácia v súvislosti s civilizáciou ovplyvnila tiež hodnotenie systémových transformačných procesov, ktoré sa odohrali od roku 1989. Spoločnosti užšie zviazané s východnou civilizáciou (západné Pomoransko) sú akoby horšie pripravené na túto transformáciu, napriek dobrým ukazovateľom socio-ekonomickeho rozvoja, čo vyúsťuje do silnejšej túžby po predchádzajúcim systéme. Spoločnosti, ktoré sa primkli k západnej civilizácii, napriek očividnému kultúrnemu tradičionalizmu (a azda práve kvôli nemu) a často s nižšími (ale zvyšujúcimi sa) indikátormi rozvoja, sú akoby spokojnejšie s novou situáciou.

Diferenciácia vplyvu vlastností súvisiacich s civilizáciou by sa mala tiež vnímať podľa tvrdenia S. P. Huntingtona (1989), ktoré vyslovil v súvislosti s Ukrajinou, ako zdrojom regionálnej diferenciácie politických sympatií. Silnejší „východný“ vplyv a horšia pripravenosť na návrat k normám typickým pre západnú civilizáciu by bol výhodný pre poľskú ľavicu, ktorá sa stotožňuje so socialistickým modelom, založenom na východnom type. Silnejšie „západné“ vplyvy by boli výhodnejšie pre poľskú pravicu, ktorá sa stotožňuje so zápasom za návrat k normám typickým pre západnú civilizáciu. Liberáli a farmári by do tejto schémy mohli tiež dobre zapadnúť. Liberáli by patrili k elitárskej a silne svetskej, zvyčajne mestskej komunite, ktorá má korene v západných tradíciah. Farmári by patrili k tradičnej vidieckej komunite, ktorej väzby so západom sú najslabšie.

Porovnanie výsledkov volieb zo začiatku minulého storočia (1922) a jeho konca (1997) a podobnosti, ktoré možno pozorovať pri takomto porovnaní, potvrdzujú presvedčenie, že regionálna diferenciácia volebného správania obyvateľov Poľska vôbec nie je otázkou prchavej módy alebo dočasnej príležitosti. Silná korelácia priebehu hraníc jednotlivých častí s rozdielnymi historickými skúsenosťami konkrétnych komunit akoby naznačovala, že hypotéza, ktorá tvrdí, že je to účinok vplyvu rôznych civilizačných systémov, by mohla byť správna.

Preložila H. Contrerasová